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A  NON-CONTENTIOUS  ACCOUNT  OF  ARTICLE
III’S  DOMESTIC  RELATIONS  EXCEPTION
James E. Pfander* & Emily K. Damrau**
ABSTRACT
 Scholars and jurists have long debated the origins and current scope of the so-called domestic
relations exception to Article III.  Rooted in the perception that certain family law matters lie
beyond the power of the federal courts, the exception was first articulated in the nineteenth-century
decisional law of the Supreme Court and has perplexed observers ever since.  Scholarly debate
continues, despite the Court’s twentieth-century decision to place the exception firmly on statutory
grounds in an effort to limit its potentially disruptive force.
This Article offers a novel, historically grounded account of the domestic relations exception,
connecting its origins to the Article III distinction between “cases” and “controversies.”  Much
domestic relations law fails to present a “controversy” within the meaning of Article III; the
consensual nature of many status-altering acts (marriage, consensual divorce, adoption) fore-
closes a federal dispute-resolution role.  But when federal courts hear “cases” arising under fed-
eral law, they have full power to exercise both contentious and (what Roman and civil lawyers
refer to as) non-contentious jurisdiction.  Our non-contentious account explains a range of puz-
zles, including why Article III courts can issue decrees at the core of the domestic relations excep-
tion when the matter at hand implicates federal law.
INTRODUCTION
Like the probate exception, a doctrinal twin separated at birth, the
domestic relations exception to Article III has been the subject of frequent
scholarly contestation.1  No consensus account explains the exception’s con-
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1 See, e.g., Barbara Ann Atwood, Domestic Relations Cases in Federal Court: Toward a Prin-
cipled Exercise of Jurisdiction, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 571 (1984); Naomi R. Cahn, Family Law, Feder-
alism, and the Federal Courts, 79 IOWA L. REV. 1073 (1994); Michael Ashley Stein, The Domestic
Relations Exception to Federal Jurisdiction: Rethinking an Unsettled Federal Courts Doctrine, 36 B.C.
L. REV. 669 (1995); Allan D. Vestal & David L. Foster, Implied Limitations on the Diversity
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stitutional and statutory origins or its scope in the present day.  To be sure,
the Supreme Court narrowed the domestic relations exception considerably
in Ankenbrandt v. Richards,2 holding that it was a restriction on the statutory
power of the district courts to exercise diversity jurisdiction.3  But Judge Rich-
ard Posner, among others, has observed that the same language that suppos-
edly gave rise to the exception on the diversity side (a statutory grant of
jurisdiction limited to matters of “common law or in equity” that omits claims
before the ecclesiastical courts in England) also appears in the statutory
grant of jurisdiction over cases (in law and equity) arising under the Consti-
tution, laws, and treaties of the United States.4  How then can the exception
apply only to diversity matters and not also impose a limit on the power of
the federal courts to entertain federal question cases that happen to arise in
the context of domestic relations?
Other questions abound.  The federal courts have long disclaimed juris-
diction as to matters related to divorce, alimony, and child custody, yet have
demonstrated a willingness to exercise appellate jurisdiction over such mat-
ters arising in territorial courts.5  Equally puzzling, the Court views the
domestic relations exception as extending to matters of child custody though
the only Supreme Court case addressing the matter arose in the context of a
federal habeas corpus petition.6  Further, while some have proposed to
explain the domestic relations exception with a status-property distinction,7
the courts have never wholeheartedly endorsed such a view.8  And while the
Court attempted to clarify the scope of the exception in Ankenbrandt, lower
federal courts continue to apply the domestic relations exception in an
apparently haphazard fashion.9
In this Article, we propose a new account of the domestic relations
exception.  We begin with the proposition that Article III extends the judicial
power only to the “Cases” and “Controversies” that appear on the jurisdic-
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1956); Anthony B. Ullman, Note, The
Domestic Relations Exception to Diversity Jurisdiction, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1824 (1983).
2 504 U.S. 689, 704 (1992) (reading the exception to block suits brought in diversity
for divorce, alimony, and child support).
3 Id. at 700.
4 Jones v. Brennan, 465 F.3d 304, 307 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Judiciary Act of 1789, ch.
20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (1789)); see also Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 715 n.8 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (noting that the federal-question grant of jurisdiction also limits the judicial
power in federal question cases to cases in law and equity).
5 See De La Rama v. De La Rama, 201 U.S. 303 (1906) (exercising jurisdiction over a
case arising in the territorial court of the Philippines); Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162
(1899) (affirming a judgment for alimony in a divorce suit arising from a judgment of the
Supreme Court of the Territory of Arizona).
6 In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 595 (1890).
7 See Vestal & Foster, supra note 1, at 31.
8 See Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 807 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (noting that courts
decided questions of status incidental to the exercise of their established jurisdiction).
9 See generally Emily J. Sack, The Domestic Relations Exception, Domestic Violence, and Equal
Access to Federal Courts, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1441, 1455–56, 1461–66 (2006) (discussing
lower courts’ conflicting applications of the exception post-Ankenbrandt).
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tional menu.10  While the term “cases” extends broadly enough to include
both disputes over federal law between adverse parties and a range of ex
parte or non-contentious federal matters (such as naturalization petitions,
the administration of bankruptcy estates, and in rem proceedings in admi-
ralty jurisdiction),11 the idea of a “controversy” has a narrower scope.  It
encompasses only disputes between the opposing parties identified in Article
III and forecloses the federal courts from entertaining administrative or ex
parte proceedings based on state law.12  We think the inability of federal
courts to exercise non-contentious investitive jurisdiction over matters of
state law helps to explain the domestic relations exception.  Just as the ex
parte character of much state probate law means that Article III courts can-
not entertain such matters,13 so too we find that the ex parte and investitive
features of state family law place some aspects of domestic relations beyond
the federal judicial power.
Domestic relations often begin with a marriage (but couples can cer-
tainly cohabit and start a family without one).  Although sometimes charac-
terized as a matter of contract, the recognition of a legally valid marriage
works as a consensual change in the parties’ status.14  The parties do not
10 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (extending the judicial power of the United States to all
“[c]ases, in [l]aw and [e]quity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties” and “to [c]ontroversies” to which the United States is a party, between
two or more states, between a state and citizens of another state, and between citizens of
another state or foreign state).
11 See James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III Judicial Power, the Adverse-Party
Requirement, and Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, 124 YALE L.J. 1346, 1361, 1367–71, 1375 (2015)
(listing naturalization proceedings, transfers of property, warrant applications, and uncon-
tested bankruptcy proceedings, among others, as proceedings that lack adverse parties).
But cf. Ann Woolhandler, Adverse Interests and Article III (Va. Pub. Law & Legal Theory,
Working Paper No. 2016-41, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2803279 (arguing that such
proceedings often feature adverse interests, if not adverse parties).
12 See Pfander & Birk, supra note 11, at 1356–57 (explaining that “[c]ontroversies”
arise between adverse parties and are subject to federal diversity jurisdiction whereas
“[c]ases” include not only disputed adverse claims but also certain petitions brought on an
ex parte basis (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2)).
13 For an account of the probate exception predicated on the inability of federal
courts to entertain ex parte or uncontested proceedings on matters governed by state law,
see James E. Pfander & Michael J.T. Downey, In Search of the Probate Exception, 67 VAND. L.
REV. 1533 (2014).  The domestic relations exception shares something in common with
the probate exception, which operates to foreclose federal jurisdiction over certain pro-
bate matters that would otherwise qualify for federal jurisdiction. See Marshall v. Marshall,
547 U.S. 293, 306–08 (2006) (“Like the domestic relations exception, the probate excep-
tion has been linked to language contained in the Judiciary Act of 1789.”).  Both excep-
tions have been connected to the omission of traditional ecclesiastical matters from Article
III. See Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383-84 (1930) (explaining that federal
jurisdiction over vice consuls did not include suits for divorce or alimony because these
matters “would have belonged to the ecclesiastical Courts” and were thus not included in
Article III’s jurisdictional scope).  We challenge this account in Section II.A.
14 Marriage was viewed as a “civil status, of one man and one woman united in law for
life” but was, in legal writings, denominated as a contract though different than other
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dispute a claim; they seek to secure the benefits (legal, religious, social) that
come with the formal recognition of their union.15  So long as the right to
matrimony has been defined by state law,16 federal courts as such have no
role to play in the administration of that law.  Federal judges do occasionally
perform marriages, but do so by virtue of local law that confers power on
them to preside over a marital ceremony.17  Where, by contrast, Congress has
adopted federal laws to govern aspects of domestic relations,18 we have little
doubt that the federal courts could perform the full panoply of administra-
tive chores that today fall within the domestic relations exception.  Such mat-
ters would constitute not controversies under state law, but cases under
federal law as to which the adverse-party requirement does not apply in
full.19  Similarly, treaty-based claims in the domestic relations sphere arise
contracts because of the personal nature of the subject. JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTA-
RIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, AND EVIDENCE IN MATRIMONIAL SUITS 27–28
(Bos., Little, Brown & Co., 3d ed. 1859) (1852).
15 Once a marriage has been determined valid, either because a couple has produced
a legally viable marriage certificate or is otherwise able to demonstrate a valid informal
marriage, the spouses are able to secure the rights and privileges of marital status. See
MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CEN-
TURY AMERICA 64 (1985).  Formal recognition counts for a lot. See Obergefell v. Hodges,
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015) (emphasizing the importance of the “symbolic recognition”
and “material benefits” that society makes available to married couples).
16 See HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 12, 19–20 (2000)
(“Many legal subjects were monopolies of the states.  And one such subject was the law of
marriage and divorce.  Every state had a law of marriage.  Every state had its legal
peculiarities.”).
17 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 106 (West 2016) (authorizing a federal judge or
magistrate of the state to perform a marriage ceremony); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-303 (West
2016) (same); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-13 (West 2016) (same); TEX. FAM. CODE § 2.202
(2016) (same).  Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg presides over marriages in the District of
Columbia and invokes the powers vested by the Constitution and laws of the United States
in pronouncing the couple husband and wife.  Maureen Dowd, Presiding at Same-Sex Wed-
ding, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Emphasizes the Word ‘Constitution,’ N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2015/05/18/presiding-at-same-sex-wedding-
ruth-bader-ginsburg-emphasizes-a-key-word/.  This seems apt to the extent one regards the
territorial laws of the District of Columbia as laws of the United States.
18 We take no position on Congress’s power to legislate a national code of family law.
For doubts on the subject, see United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), striking down
part of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) on federalism grounds.  For a critique of
the Court’s decision, see generally Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender,
and the Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619 (2001) (arguing that family and criminal law issues, such as
violence against women, have long been subjected to federal lawmaking and that the
VAWA should not be treated differently).
19 See Pfander & Birk, supra note 11, at 1356–57 (distinguishing between “cases” aris-
ing under federal law in which federal courts may exercise non-contentious jurisdiction
and “controversies” over state law in which the federal courts may adjudicate only disputes
between opposing parties).
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under federal law and thus do not implicate the limited power of federal
courts over matters of state law.20
Courts have administered other features of domestic relations in the
absence of a dispute between parties.  For example, the English High Court
of Equity took the lead in appointing guardians for children who had no
parents to play that role.21  No genuine dispute was required to bring this
appointment power into play.  Similarly, parties seeking (no-fault) divorce
often do so today in the absence of any dispute,22 just as in earlier times the
parties to a nominally contested divorce might feign a dispute to secure a
formal change in status that they both (devoutly) sought.23  If one thinks of
the family as a bundle of legal relations called into being through the per-
formance of legally binding acts (marriage) and split asunder by other legally
binding acts (divorce), one can easily see why the federal courts viewed them-
selves as lacking the power to perform any uncontested registration or certifi-
cation role necessitated by the formalization of these state law status changes.
They simply lacked power to administer state law in the absence of a dispute.
But once a dispute arose between parties whose disparate citizenship satisfied
the demands of federal jurisdiction, the federal courts were, if sometimes
grudgingly, willing to entertain the matter as a part of their standing diversity
jurisdiction.
One gets a sense of this grudging willingness from the Supreme Court’s
first attempt to explain the scope of federal judicial power in the domestic
relations context.  In Barber v. Barber,24 the Court agreed to permit the lower
federal courts to hear a dispute between former spouses that met the require-
20 See, e.g., Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction,
art. 1, Oct. 25, 1980, 80 Stat. 271, 1343 U.N.T.S. 98 (seeking to “secure the prompt return
of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State” and to “ensure
that rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively
respected in the other Contracting States”).
21 The English king, in his position as parens patriae, was the legal guardian of minors
and delegated the task of appointing a legal guardian to the lord chancellor. JOSEPH
CHITTY, JR., A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE PREROGATIVES OF THE CROWN; AND THE RELA-
TIVE DUTIES AND RIGHTS OF THE SUBJECT 155–58 (London, Joseph Butterworth & Son
1820).  When the power was granted to the lord chancellor, it was not considered to form
part of the chancellor’s general jurisdiction but was “merely a power of administration.”
Id. at 158 (emphasis omitted).
22 Every American jurisdiction today allows no-fault divorces. See Lynn D. Wardle, No-
Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 BYU L. REV. 79, 79, 90 n.50 (1991) (stating
that all jurisdictions but Arkansas, which now allows for a version of a no-fault divorce after
non-cohabitation lasting at least eighteen months, have adopted explicit no-fault grounds
for divorce).
23 Feigned disputes to obtain divorces, often called collusive divorces, were refused by
a number of states when the parties’ plans came to light. See CARROLL D. WRIGHT, A
REPORT ON MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1867 TO 1886, at 118 (Wash.,
Gov’t Printing Office 1891).  Collusion was particularly problematic in late eighteenth-cen-
tury England and may have existed from the beginning of divorce procedure dating back
to 1700. See LAWRENCE STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE: ENGLAND 1530–1987, at 208 (1990).
24 62 U.S. 582 (1858).
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ments of diversity.25  But, pressed by a dissenting opinion that argued for a
broad exception, the Court explained that certain other questions of domes-
tic relations lay outside the scope of federal judicial power: “We disclaim alto-
gether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United States upon the subject of
divorce, or for the allowance of alimony, either as an original proceeding in
chancery or as an incident to divorce a vinculo, or to one from bed and
board.”26  While one can certainly interpret this language more broadly, we
think the majority may have been identifying situations in which the requisite
elements of diversity of citizenship were likely unavailable.  To the extent that
the Court sought to define judicial power by reference to the elements of
diversity, and said nothing to foreclose federal question jurisdiction, the deci-
sion identifies an important fracture line in Article III, although we have
some tidying up to do around the edges.
 In offering a novel view of the domestic relations exception, this Article
begins in Part I with a critical overview of leading scholarly accounts.  In Part
II, the Article lays the groundwork for our non-contentious alternative, offer-
ing both a brief history of marriage and placing its many investitive features
into the civil law context of non-contentious jurisdiction.  Part III of the Arti-
cle applies our theory to current issues in domestic relations law, including
the Court’s decision in Ankenbrandt and the questions that have since arisen
in the lower federal courts.  We conclude that some issues in the current
debate over family law limits on federal judicial power can best be resolved
with a non-contentious view of the domestic relations exception.
I. TRADITIONAL ACCOUNTS OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS EXCEPTION
In this Part, we offer a quick sketch of the widely ranging accounts of the
domestic relations exception that have worked their way into the scholarly
literature.27  We begin by considering and rejecting one of the most fre-
quently invoked theories of the exception, the claim that it derives from the
inability of the federal courts to entertain matters that were grist for the
ecclesiastical courts in England.  We next consider a variety of allied
accounts, all of which emphasize the traditional role of state law in defining
domestic relations and the corresponding expertise of the state courts in
such matters.  Finally, we sketch two articles, the claims of which hint at rele-
vant considerations.
25 Id. at 592.
26 Id. at 584.  For the cogent suggestion that Barber represents a canonical example of
family law localism, primarily explicable through the logic of coverture, see JILL ELAINE
HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED 24–26 (2014).
27 The Supreme Court has not offered a definitive rationale for the domestic relations
exception, though its decision in Ankenbrandt noted several proffered explanations. 13E
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3609.1 (3d ed., rev.
2016).
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A. Federal Courts and Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction
Scholars (and courts) have often suggested in one way or another that
federal courts lack the power to entertain matters that were decided in
England not by the courts of law or equity, but by the ecclesiastical courts.28
This claim has a superficial plausibility.  In England, the High Court of Chan-
cery handled matters of equity jurisdiction, the Courts of Common Pleas and
King’s Bench entertained proceedings at law, and the court of admiralty
managed matters that arose on salty water and on the “great” navigable
streams of the country, such as the Thames River.29  A separate set of English
courts, the ecclesiastical courts, exercised a very different jurisdiction.30
Church courts in England handled such secular matters as the admission of
wills to probate, intestate succession,31 bastardy,32 defamation,33 as well as
more evidently religious matters, such as heresy and excommunication.34
28 See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383–84 (1930) (voicing the view
that the ecclesiastical nature of domestic relations suits foreclosed federal courts of law and
equity from entertaining such matters); Barber, 62 U.S. at 590–91 (discussing state court
jurisdiction over matters given to the ecclesiastical court and the ability of courts of equity
to interfere to compel payment of alimony once decreed by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion). But see Bradley G. Silverman, Note, Federal Questions and the Domestic-Relations Excep-
tion, 125 YALE L.J. 1364, 1399 (2016) (calling the claim that domestic relations cases fall
beyond the scope of Article III jurisdiction because English law and equity courts could not
hear these cases an oversimplification of “the jurisdictional complexities of English domes-
tic-relations law” that “disregards colonial practice”).
29 For an overview of the structure of English courts in the eighteenth century, see 1
W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 194–264, 446–76 (3d ed., rev. 1922).
30 Id. at 580–632; see also R. H. HELMHOLZ, CANON LAW AND THE LAW OF ENGLAND 171
(1987) (“Justice in England was not a unitary matter.  Merchant courts, borough courts,
and ecclesiastical courts all exercised jurisdiction over matters not covered, or only par-
tially covered, by the royal courts.”).
31 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 29, at 625 (“The ecclesiastical courts obtained jurisdiction
over grants of Probate and Administration, and, to a certain degree, over the conduct of
the executor and the administrator.”).
32 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *428, *442–47
(discussing the circumstances of bastardy and the role of parents and the law).  Bastardy
frequently arose in questions of divorce.  In cases of total divorce, the marriage was
declared null, as if never having been.  “The issue of such marriage, as is thus entirely
dissolved, are bastards.” Id. at 428.  The close relationship between marriage and bastardy
elucidates the ecclesiastical jurisdiction over such matters.
33 In fact, until most of their powers were abolished or transferred to specialized
courts in the mid-nineteenth century, the ecclesiastical courts in England “exercised a very
extended jurisdiction, comprising not only what we should ordinarily call ecclesiastical
causes, but matrimonial suits and divorces a mensa et thoro, all testamentary causes and suits,
suits for church rates, and suits for defamation.” The English Law Courts, VI: The Ecclesiasti-
cal Courts, 88 GREEN BAG 330, 330 (1896).
34 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 29, at 616–19, 630 (noting that heresy is the “most impor-
tant” offense against religion and discussing the court’s mode of enforcement of its
decrees by way of excommunication).
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They also handled a wide range of domestic relations matters, including mar-
riage, divorce,35 and some aspects of custody and support.36
Article III extends the judicial power to cases in law and equity, arising
under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, and to cases of
admiralty jurisdiction,37 but it does not confer jurisdiction over ecclesiastical
matters.  One can argue from this omission that Article III excludes from
federal judicial cognizance all matters that the English church courts han-
dled at the time of the framing.  By the same token, when Congress in 1789
conferred jurisdiction on the lower federal courts over disputes between citi-
zens of different states, it expressly declared that the jurisdiction would
extend only to suits in “law or in equity.”38  Both the constitutional provision
and the iconic early codification of the judicial power thus refrain from con-
ferring ecclesiastical jurisdiction.  Perhaps, then, the federal courts simply
cannot hear ecclesiastical matters—a gap in federal judicial power that could
explain the domestic relations exception.  Indeed, when the Supreme Court
gave voice to a limited modern version of the exception in Ankenbrandt v.
Richards,39 it relied on Congress’s longstanding grant of jurisdiction only in
law and equity in concluding that domestic matters were excluded.40
For three reasons, however, we do not believe that the omission of eccle-
siastical jurisdiction from Article III and the diversity statute can explain the
domestic relations exception.  First, as one of us has argued elsewhere, it
would have been entirely incongruous for the framers of Article III to have
extended federal judicial power to ecclesiastical matters.41  Ecclesiastical
courts arose in England to adjust relations between parishioners and the
established church.  If parishioners disobeyed church law, through fornica-
35 Id. at 621–24 (stating that ecclesiastical courts had undisputed jurisdiction in matri-
monial cases and complete control over divorce law until 1857); see also BLACKSTONE, supra
note 32, at *421 (“The holiness of the matrimonial state is left entirely to the ecclesiastical
law. . . .”).
36 Issues of custody and guardianship of minors were traditionally handled by the
Court of Chancery by way of the King’s prerogative power. CHITTY, supra note 21, at 156
(characterizing the care of infants as “peculiarly a prerogative of the Crown”).  Canon law,
however, gave some jurisdiction to ecclesiastical courts to appoint guardians as protectors
of the interests of children. HELMHOLZ, supra note 30, at 215. Ecclesiastical courts only
regularly provided guardians for minors with potential rights to part of a decedent’s estate.
Thus the limited reach of those courts was tied up in their exercise of probate jurisdiction.
Id. at 243.  Alimony or support payments were more closely tied to the power of the ecclesi-
astical courts to issue divorce decrees.  Traditionally, after a wife was successful in a suit
against her husband, the court awarded her permanent alimony as a continuation of the
husband’s spousal duty. STONE, supra note 23, at 210.  The formal relationship remained
intact.
37 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
38 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78.
39 504 U.S. 689 (1992).
40 Id. at 698–700.
41 Pfander & Downey, supra note 13, at 1544–46.
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tion or blasphemy, say, they were subject to sanctions.42  The ultimate sanc-
tion, excommunication, severed the tie between communicant and church,
threatening the soul of the outcast parishioner.  Even more mundane dis-
putes, such as those over probate or intestate succession, depended on the
threat of excommunication to give teeth to church court orders, although
secular courts would lend a hand.43  One can easily see why the framers of
the Constitution, which after all creates a secular government with no estab-
lished church and rules out religious tests for office, would have omitted such
a judicial authority.44  If no federal court was thought to have had any busi-
ness issuing an excommunication decree, the omission of ecclesiastical juris-
diction from Article III offers little assistance in defining the scope of the
judicial power.
Second, it would be extremely odd to conclude that all subjects handled
by the church courts in England have been placed off limits to the federal
judiciary.  To be sure, some subjects of ecclesiastical competence (probate
and domestic relations) have been understood to fall primarily within the
competence of the state courts45 (even there, states established probate and
orphans’ courts, rather than church courts, to handle the business).46  But
many matters once handled by the church courts now appear regularly on
federal dockets.  Consider usury claims, a frequent topic of ecclesiastical
42 The severity of sanctions depended largely on the seriousness of the crime.  A lesser
offense might warrant a “monition,” a judicial warning, while a more serious offense would
merit a penance. See R.B. OUTHWAITE, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE ENGLISH ECCLESIASTICAL
COURTS, 1500–1860, at 10 (2006).
43 Ecclesiastical courts enforced their decrees through excommunication.  However,
“[i]f the excommunicate did not submit within forty days, the ecclesiastical court signified
this to the crown, and thereon a writ de excommunicato capiendo issued to the sheriff.  He
took the offender and kept him in prison till he submitted.” See HOLDSWORTH, supra note
29, at 630–31; see also R. H. HELMHOLZ, THE SPIRIT OF CLASSICAL CANON LAW 358-60 (1996)
(detailing how secular courts provided the means necessary for ecclesiastical courts seeking
to enforce their excommunication decrees).
44 The records of the federal convention do not show even a proposal to confer eccle-
siastical jurisdiction on federal courts. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 125 (Max Farrand ed., 1910) (omitting any reference to ecclesiastical courts from
the index of the constitutional debates).
45 See GROSSBERG, supra note 15, at 238 (noting the primacy of the state judiciary in
devising and applying the basic principles of nineteenth-century family law); HARTOG,
supra note 16, at 12–20 (“States were the powerful legal institutions in the government of
marriage.  They were where marriages were constituted legally.”); Pfander & Downey,
supra note 13, at 1550 (“At the time of the [f]raming, state court systems handled probate
matters, and few would have anticipated the wholesale transfer of probate proceedings
from state to federal court.”); see also Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 581 n.54 (1962)
(describing both probate and domestic relations proceedings as those “traditionally within
the domain of the States”).
46 The first family law courts developed in the early twentieth century and today most
state court systems have family courts. See Cahn, supra note 1, at 1091.  Probate courts
developed even earlier, dating back to the colonial era. See John F. Winkler, The Probate
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 14 PROB. L.J. 77, 91 (1997) (describing the varied powers of
the colonial probate courts).
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investigation.47  Today, a federal statute48 regulates the usury claims that
individuals can mount against nationally chartered banks and no one argues
that the absence of ecclesiastical power debars the federal courts from enter-
taining the claims.49  Similarly, federal courts often hear defamation claims,
either in the exercise of their diversity jurisdiction,50 or on review of the state
courts’ rejection of a constitutional defense.51  The usury and defamation
examples underscore an important truth: the power of the federal courts
extends to all matters of federal law.  The principle of co-extensivity holds
that the federal courts have power to adjudicate federal questions that arise
from any lawful federal statute or from claims that state action violates the
Constitution.52
Third, with the growing importance of federal and international law in
matters relating to child custody and support, one can scarcely imagine a
world in which all domestic relations matters lie beyond the reach of the
federal judiciary.53  Congress has adopted the Parental Kidnapping Preven-
tion Act, a federal law that aims to strengthen the interstate enforcement of
child custody decrees.54  To address the same group of issues at the interna-
tional level, the United States has ratified an international treaty to secure
47 Canon 109 of the ecclesiastical canons of 1604 listed usury as an offense that
required the churchwardens to present the offender “to the intent that they, and every of
them, may be punished by the severity of the laws, according to their deserts . . . .”  6
CHURCH OF ENGLAND RECORD SOCIETY: THE ANGLICAN CANONS 1529–1947, at 409 (Gerald
Bray ed., 1998).
48 12 U.S.C. §§ 85–86 (2012).
49 See Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 9–11 (2003) (concluding that
federal law entirely preempts the application of state usury laws to national banks, thus
transforming all such usury claims into federal rights of action).
50 See, e.g., Biospherics, Inc. v. Forbes, Inc., 151 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 1998) (applying
state defamation law in the context of diversity jurisdiction); Caster v. Hennessey, 781 F.2d
1569, 1570 (11th Cir. 1986) (reversing the district court’s dismissal of a state defamation
claim brought under the court’s diversity jurisdiction).
51 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) (holding on appeal from
state court that the First Amendment protected the newspaper from liability for defama-
tion of a public figure).
52 See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 809 (1824) (explaining
that the great object of the judiciary article in extending jurisdiction over all cases was to
“make it co-extensive with the power of legislation”); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264, 384 (1821) (offering as a political axiom that “the judicial power of every well
constituted government must be co-extensive with the legislative, and must be capable of
deciding every judicial question which grows out of the constitution and laws”).
53 For a critique of the overriding concern with localism in family law despite creeping
federal involvement, see Courtney G. Joslin, The Perils of Family Law Localism, 48 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 623, 629 (2014) (noting that even though scholars have recognized the involve-
ment of federal law in domestic relations matters, a continued belief in the exclusive role
of the states persists); see also HASDAY, supra note 26, at 17–66.
54 Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2012); see Thomp-
son v. Thompson, 48 U.S. 174, 187 (1988) (holding that the “context, language, and his-
tory of the PKPA together make out a conclusive case against inferring a cause of action in
federal court to determine which of two conflicting state custody decrees is valid”).
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the child custody rights of non-resident parents.55  Implementing legislation
assigns these disputes to the federal courts,56 and one such dispute recently
made its way to the Supreme Court.57  A full-throated domestic relations
exception would threaten not only the coherence and uniformity of federal
law but also the power of Congress to rely on the federal courts to implement
the nation’s international obligations.
No wonder, then, that in defining the modern limits of the domestic
relations exception, the Supreme Court restricted the exception to the diver-
sity jurisdiction of the lower federal courts.  In Ankenbrandt, the Court treated
the diversity statute as if it incorporated the historic law-and-equity limits and
thus excluded matters involving domestic relations.58  Congress had, by re-
enacting the provision without change, incorporated the Court’s own domes-
tic relations gloss into the statute.59  Such a strategy works to cabin the excep-
tion, leaving the federal question jurisdiction of the lower federal courts
intact, and preserving the Court’s own power to review state court decisions
for compliance with federal law.  But the Court’s dodge came at the cost of
clarity and consistency.  Hence, Justice Blackmun’s caustic observation that
the same law-and-equity limits apparently applied to other historic statutory
grants of subject matter jurisdiction (and also perhaps to those in Article
III).60  Nonetheless, one can argue that, by glossing a statute, Ankenbrandt at
least tied the exception down to a specific text and gave Congress (rather
55 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction art. 1,
Oct. 25, 1980, 80 Stat. 271, 1343 U.N.T.S. 98, 98 (seeking to “secure the prompt return of
children wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State” and “[t]o ensure that
rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively
respected in the other Contracting States”).
56 International Child Abduction Remedies Act, Pub. L. No. 100-300, 102 Stat. 437
(codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 9001–08, 9010–11, and 42 U.S.C § 663); see generally Abbott v.
Abbott, 560 U.S. 1 (2010) (interpreting the International Child Abduction Remedies Act).
57 Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017 (2013) (holding that, after a child is returned to
his or her country of habitual residence pursuant to a court order, any appeal of such an
order is not moot).
58 Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 698 (1992) (discussing the Judiciary Act of
1789 and “[t]he defining phrase [that] ‘all suits of a civil nature[,] at common law or in
equity’” demarcated the terms of diversity jurisdiction, thereby excluding domestic rela-
tions matters (quoting 1948 Judicial Code and Judiciary Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332)).
59 Id. at 700 (“We thus are content to rest our conclusion that a domestic relations
exception exists as a matter of statutory construction not on the accuracy of the historical
justifications on which it was seemingly based, but rather on Congress’ apparent accept-
ance of this construction of the diversity jurisdiction provisions in the years prior to 1948,
when the statute limited jurisdiction to ‘suits of a civil nature[,] at common law or in
equity.’” (quoting 1948 Judicial Code and Judiciary Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332)).
60 Id. at 715 n.8 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting that the federal question grant of
jurisdiction also limits the judicial power in federal question cases to cases in law and
equity).
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than new historical research) primary responsibility for shaping the excep-
tion’s future direction.61
Ankenbrandt suffers from another defect, one anticipated in Judge Wein-
stein’s opinion in Spindel v. Spindel.62  There, Weinstein observed that Article
III’s law-and-equity limits apply only to cases arising under the Constitution,
laws, and treaties of the United States.63  A similar law-and-equity limit does
not apply to the extension of judicial power to controversies between citizens
of different states.64  Weinstein drew the obvious conclusion: while the law-
and-equity limits might constrain to some extent the power of the federal
courts in federal question cases, the limits do not evidently apply to contro-
versies between parties whose alignment satisfies the jurisdictional require-
ments of Article III.65  Weinstein’s point, though not particularly useful in
the wake of Ankenbrandt’s restriction on the statutory power of the federal
courts in diversity suits, will prove helpful later in the Article when we
attempt to reconstruct the Article III origins of the domestic relations
exception.
B. Traditional State Control of Domestic Relations
Before the Constitution’s framing, states (and before them, colonies)
exercised control over matters of domestic relations.66  For the most part, as
the Court observed in In re Burrus,67 this tradition of state control has shaped
conceptions of the proper allocation of lawmaking authority between the
states and the federal government.  Observers commonly note that the states
have traditionally controlled the content of domestic relations law68 and
have, in the process, gained significant expertise in the resolution of domes-
61 See Cahn, supra note 1, at 1083 (noting that “Ankenbrandt does not preclude Con-
gress from enacting legislation to change the parameters of the Exception to allow federal
courts to hear [domestic relations] cases”).
62 283 F. Supp. 797, 800–01 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Cf. Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297,
1322–23 (1998) (noting that the Founders contemplated exclusive localism in family law
but failed to discuss a number of topics, including administrative law and economic regula-
tion, now within federal jurisdiction).
67 136 U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890).
68 But see Kristin A. Collins, Federalism’s Fallacy: The Early Tradition of Federal Family Law
and the Invention of States’ Rights, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1761, 1767 (2005) (taking the position
that the standard view of federal non-involvement in domestic relations law and policy is
historically unfounded as “during the pre-Civil War era all three branches of the federal
government were actively engaged in creating and enforcing laws and policies that bore
directly on families”).  Historical evidence may suggest that “contrary to modern-day feder-
alists’ contention that domestic relations has traditionally been a sacrosanct domain of the
states, federal power did not historically yield to the states” and evidence of federal involve-
ment in family law matters is well-documented. Id. at 1804; see also HASDAY, supra note 26,
at 21–38 (tracing the presumption of family law localism as reflected in the law of federal-
ism and jurisdiction).
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tic relations matters.69  Perceptions of state primacy in lawmaking and adju-
dication fuel a variety of different arguments about the need for and scope of
the domestic relations exception.  Scholars thus observe that the involvement
of the federal courts could create a risk of conflicting or duplicative judicial
decrees,70 could insinuate federal courts into a body of law primarily of the
state’s own making,71 and could interfere with the rightful primacy of state
institutions in the crafting of domestic relations law.72
Justice Blackmun’s concurrence in Ankenbrandt gave voice to these con-
cerns.  Although he vehemently disagreed with the Court’s decision to treat
the domestic relations exception as a gloss on the language of the diversity
statute, he agreed that the Court was right to recognize a domestic relations
exception in some circumstances.73  Instead of treating the matter as one of
69 See, e.g., Struck v. Cook Cty. Pub. Guardian, 508 F.3d 858, 860 (7th Cir. 2007)
(“State courts . . . are assumed to have developed a proficiency in core probate and domes-
tic-relations matters and to have evolved procedures tailored to them . . . .”); Solomon v.
Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1025 (3d Cir. 1975) (explaining that state courts have developed
a “well-known expertise in [domestic relations] cases and a strong interest in disposing of
them”); Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1968) (same); see also Atwood, supra note
1, at 604 (arguing that state courts have developed a specialized expertise and are able to
provide additional services such as counseling that a federal court lacks). But see Joslin,
supra note 53, at 629 (questioning the viability of the state court expertise argument in the
domestic relations realm).
70 See Meredith Johnson Harbach, Is the Family a Federal Question?, 66 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 131, 149–52 (2009) (discussing the concern of duplicative proceedings as a typically
proffered reason for abstention by federal courts); see also Crouch v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 486,
487 (5th Cir. 1978) (“The reasons for federal abstention in [domestic relations] cases are
apparent: the strong state interest in domestic relations matters, the competence of state
courts in settling family disputes, the possibility of incompatible federal and state court
decrees in cases of continuing judicial supervision by the state, and the problem of con-
gested dockets in federal courts.”).
71 See GROSSBERG, supra note 15, at 17 (“[O]nly the newly created republican state had
the authority and legitimacy to oversee domestic relations. . . . The federal government
played a minor role in answering [how to renovate the domestic relations law].”); HARTOG,
supra note 16.
72 Mojica v. Nogueras-Cartagena, 573 F. Supp. 2d 520, 522 (D.P.R. 2008) (“[S]tate
courts are more eminently suited to work of this type than are federal courts, which lack
the close association with state and local government organizations dedicated to handling
issues that arise out of conflicts over divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees.” (quoting
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 704 (1992))). But see Collins, supra note 68, at
1792, 1802 (listing federal involvement in such matters touching upon domestic relations
as widow war pensions that required the widow to provide Congress with adequate docu-
mentation to prove marriage and noting that opponents of the widow pension did not
raise the issue that the federal government was meddling in matters traditionally reserved
to the states).
73 Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 707 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (agreeing that federal
courts should not hear cases involving claims for divorce, alimony, and child custody); see
also Atwood, supra note 1, at 575 (arguing that in “carefully defined circumstances the
various abstention doctrines provide a principled basis for dismissing certain kinds of
domestic relations claims” and that such use of abstention “would result in a principled
approach to and closer analysis of domestic relations suits”).
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statutory interpretation, Blackmun would have recognized the statutory
power of the federal courts to hear disputes in the domestic relations field
but would have required them to abstain in favor of state court primacy in
many contexts.74  Invoking the doctrine of Burford abstention,75 where the
federal courts refrain from entertaining claims within an area of predomi-
nant state control, Blackmun urged the application of a similar regime to
domestic relations matters.76
But the abstention alternative presents problems of its own.  For starters,
the Court has recently turned against discretionary abstention doctrines,
viewing them as judge-made departures from statutory grants of jurisdiction
that have no greater claim to legitimacy than judge-made rights of action.77
The Court views both forms of judicial discretion as inconsistent with Con-
gress’s power to define the jurisdiction of the federal courts.  Thus, the Court
recently retired the doctrine of prudential standing,78 eliminating the pros-
pect that judges may avoid matters otherwise within their jurisdiction.  Tak-
ing a page from the same playbook, Justice Scalia (the author of Lexmark)
gave voice to an extremely narrow vision of Burford abstention, preferring a
world with clear rules defining access to federal court.79  In short, the time
for expansion of Burford abstention into the field of domestic relations may
have passed.
Discretionary doctrines of avoidance prove controversial from another
vantage point.  Critics have observed that domestic relations cases do not nec-
essarily present questions that are more difficult or controversial or divisive
than other matters of state law that fetch up on federal dockets.80  Critics also
74 Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 707 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“In my view, the long-
standing, unbroken practice of the federal courts in refusing to hear domestic relations
cases is precedent at most for continued discretionary abstention rather than mandatory
limits on federal jurisdiction.”).
75 Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
76 Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 713–16 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
77 Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386–88
(2014) (discussing prudential standing and stating that a court may not limit a cause of
action that Congress has created because “‘prudence’ dictates”).
78 Id. at 1387–88 nn.3–4 (noting that the “zone-of-interests test” is properly considered
a question of statutory, not prudential, standing).
79 New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 362 (1989)
(noting that although Burford abstention is concerned with “protecting complex state
administrative processes from undue federal interference, it does not require abstention
whenever there exists such a process”).
80 The law of eminent domain, for example, often produces disputes over the nature
of the state’s interest as diverse as issues of domestic relations.  Yet neither the complexity
of, nor the magnitude of, the state interest in these proceedings precludes these suits from
adjudication in federal court. See Cty. of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185,
191–92 (1959) (holding that abstention by the district court sitting in diversity was not
justified just because the suit involved questions of state sovereignty).
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observe that the Erie81 doctrine applies with as much force to matters within
the domestic relations field as to other matters of state law.82  With Erie in
place, the prospect of federal adjudication presents fewer risks that federal
tribunals will ignore controlling state law.83  To be sure, in fields where the
law changes rapidly, any federal involvement may confront federal judges
with questions of state law that the states themselves have yet to resolve.  But
existing law in many states empowers federal courts to certify such questions
to state supreme courts for resolution, thus lessening the risk of improvident
federal lawmaking.84
Pointing to the many ways in which domestic relations cases resemble
other matters on the federal docket, some critics worry that judges may
respond to these cases with more than their usual desire to steer clear of a
complex body of state law.85  For these critics, federal courts have “naturally”
come to avoid domestic relations matters because they regard such issues of
81 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that a federal court
sitting in diversity must apply the substantive law of the state as “declared by its Legislature
in a statute or by its highest court in a decision”).
82 See Cahn, supra note 1, at 1116 (noting that the only difference between domestic
relations cases and other diversity cases is the judicial reluctance to hear the former).
83 See, e.g., Barbara Freedman Wand, A Call for the Repudiation of the Domestic Relations
Exception to Federal Jurisdiction, 30 VILL. L. REV. 307, 359 n.272 (1985) (noting that the
Supreme Court made clear in Erie that section 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789
requires federal courts in diversity to apply state substantive law); Comment, Domestic Rela-
tions—Federal Courts Held to Have Jurisdiction to Declare Divorce Invalid, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 612,
636 (1969) (same); Ullman, supra note 1, at 1844 (Erie’s holding “that federal diversity
courts must apply the substantive law of the state in which they sit eliminated the concern,
evident” in prior domestic relations cases “that federal law should not apply to such quin-
tessential state concerns as the regulation of the family”).
84 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-723 (West 2016) (stating that a certification must set
forth the question of law to be answered and “a statement of all facts relevant to the ques-
tions certified and the nature of the controversy in which the questions arose”); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 25.031 (West 2016) (authorizing the Supreme Court of Florida to answer, by writ-
ten opinion, unclear questions of law certified by federal appellate courts); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 2.60.020 (West 2016) (allowing certification when “in the opinion of any
federal court before whom a proceeding is pending, it is necessary to ascertain the local
law of this state . . . and the local law has not been clearly determined” at which point the
state “supreme court shall render its opinion in answer thereto”).  For a discussion of the
role of certification in the federal system and the potential for problems to arise in such a
system, see Jonathan Remy Nash, Examining the Power of Federal Courts to Certify Questions of
State Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1672 (2003).
85 See, e.g., Atwood, supra note 1, at 627 (concluding that the domestic relations excep-
tion saves the courts “from a distasteful category of litigation”); Cahn, supra note 1, at 1116
(noting federal courts’ reluctance to hear domestic relations cases); Stein, supra note 1, at
708-13 (discussing the judiciary’s bias against family law issues for being considered
“beneath” the proper scope of the federal courts’ jurisdiction); Wand, supra note 83, at 385
(“Although not expressly articulated in federal court opinions, there is a persistent under-
current in many cases involving the domestic relations exception: federal courts have a
distaste for domestic relations disputes.”).
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hearth and home as unfit for federal adjudication.86  In this telling, federal
judges come to the bench with a preconception of the disputes that belong
in the federal courts.  Complex commercial disputes and disputes over fed-
eral law certainly qualify, but the tendency of federal judges to shy away from
domestic relations work signals to some a subtle form of gender bias.  Critics
thus suggest that the predominantly male members of the federal judiciary
have consigned the gender-intensive issues that arise in family law to a sepa-
rate domain.87
C. Technical Explanations
One final set of arguments proposes to explain the domestic relations
exception by reference to one or more technical features of the laws that
confer jurisdiction.  Tracking similar provisions in Article III, the diversity
statute requires the presence of a dispute between citizens of different
states.88  At one time, the common law more or less presumed that spouses
share a common domicile, thus negating federal jurisdiction over many intra-
family disputes.89  Yet, interestingly, the Barber Court moderated that view as
early as 1859, observing that domicile was really a question of fact to be deter-
mined by reference to the intent and residence of the parties.90  In what
remains a leading domestic relations exception case, therefore, the Barber
Court actually agreed to entertain a dispute between former spouses on the
ground that they had established separate domiciles.  A second technical
86 See Judith Resnik, “Naturally” Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal
Courts, 66 N.YU. L. REV. 1682, 1682, 1739–50 (1991) (arguing that, despite clear federal
involvement in family law issues, “when possible, federal courts divest themselves of ‘family
issues’”).
87 Id. at 1698–99 (arguing that the absence of family law issues in federal court rele-
gates those suits most closely associated with women to state courts, thus ignoring “the
wealth of federal law that implicitly and explicitly regulates many aspects of family life”).
Because the federal courts are “understood as the place in which the national agenda is
debated and enforced,” excluding family law issues, and thereby, women, from the work of
the federal judiciary labels both women and family law issues as undeserving of a place in
public debate. Id.
88 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012) (giving district courts original jurisdiction to hear all civil
actions that exceed the $75,000 amount in controversy and arise between citizens of differ-
ent states).
89 The long established view in England was that the domicile of the wife was always
that of the husband. See Erwin N. Griswold, Divorce Jurisdiction and Recognition of Divorce
Decrees—A Comparative Study, 65 HARV. L. REV. 193, 196 (1951).  It was early accepted in the
United States, however, that a wife may have a domicile separate from her husband. Id. at
208. But see De La Rama v. De La Rama, 201 U.S. 303, 307 (1906) (noting that, though
relaxed in recent years, “husband and wife cannot usually be citizens of different states, so
long as the marriage relation continues”).
90 Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582, 595–98 (1858) (citing authority and case law to
demonstrate that “whatever may have been the doubts in an earlier day, [the cases previ-
ously cited are sufficient to show] that a wife under a judicial sentence of separation from
bed and board is entitled to make a domicil for herself, different from that of her
husband”).
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argument rests on diversity’s amount in controversy requirement.  While it
was satisfied in Barber, a dispute over support that exceeded the then-applica-
ble threshold, many family law issues present no obvious price tag.  Courts
have observed, for example, that disputes over custody and guardianship, at
least those that take place in the absence of any child support issues, do not
necessarily entail a value in controversy.91  Statutory limitations thus restrict
access to federal courts to a rather significant degree.
Two other technical arguments offer hints that require further consider-
ation.  In a paper from the 1950s, Vestal and Foster argued that many domes-
tic relations cases present issues of status or property that do not necessarily
map readily onto the traditional work of the federal courts.92  Others have
noted that the Court’s recent pronouncements in Ankenbrandt93 and Mar-
shall94 are consistent with the view that the domestic relations exception
relates not to the subject of domestic relations, “but to particular status-
related functions that fall within state power and competence.”95  We believe,
as we develop at greater length in the next Part, that the investitive and sta-
tus-altering nature of many matters of domestic relations law has a measure
of explanatory power.
A suggestive student note from the early 1980s identifies two somewhat
related factors that may inform the power of federal courts to entertain
domestic relations matters.96  This commentator observes that state courts
sometimes act as “third parties” in passing on certain features of domestic
relations, and questions the federal courts’ power to play such a role.97  Sec-
91 See, e.g., In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 595 (1890) (noting that “the matter in dispute”
was “incapable of being reduced to any standard of pecuniary value”); Barry v. Mercein, 46
U.S. 103, 106 (1847) (observing in a habeas corpus action to regain custody that “[t]here is
no pecuniary value to the subject in controversy, nor any way in which pecuniary value can
be ascertained”).
92 Vestal & Foster, supra note 1, at 23–31.  After discussing the seminal domestic rela-
tions cases and dismissing traditionally proffered rationales for the exception, Vestal and
Foster state “federal courts will not exercise jurisdiction where a determination of status is
involved.” Id. at 28.  They argue that if the action is one purely concerning a right to
recover “because of some contractual, quasi-contractual or tortious wrong that has been
committed,” federal courts should exercise jurisdiction. Id. at 31.  Federal courts should
refuse to exercise jurisdiction in domestic relations cases only “where a problem of status
arises.” Id. If only property rights are concerned, jurisdiction should be exercised. Id.
93 Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992).
94 Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006).
95 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 27, § 3609.1; see also Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279, 291
(6th Cir. 1998) (finding support in Ankenbrandt to differentiate between those “core”
domestic relations cases involving “declaration of marital or parental status” and those
“constitutional claim[s] in which it is incidental that the underlying dispute involves a
divorce”).
96 See generally Ullman, supra note 1.
97 Id. at 1854–56 (arguing that when state law conforms to a traditional third-party
model of divorce, such that the judge does not sit as an impartial arbiter but instead serves
to further the state’s interest in preserving marriage, federal “diversity jurisdiction should
be declined”).
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ond, the commentator invokes the case-or-controversy requirement, sug-
gesting that the federal courts may be foreclosed from doing investitive work
that does not entail the resolution of disputes between adversaries.98  While
we believe that the federal courts can exercise inquisitorial or “third-party”
powers, they can do so only in connection with the administration of federal
law.  We argue in the next Part that this limited federal judicial power over
state-law controversies both explains (and helps to confine) the domestic
relations exception.
II. THE NON-CONTENTIOUS CORE OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW
In this Part, we develop our theory that the non-contentious and investi-
tive nature of much judicial administration of domestic relations law explains
why federal courts do not perform marriages or enter other consensual
decrees, at least when state law governs those matters.  After offering a brief
history of marriage and its legal incidents, we sketch the law of non-conten-
tious jurisdiction, a mode frequently employed by British ecclesiastical courts
as well as courts of equity and admiralty.  We contrast these non-contentious
modes of procedure, commonly invoked when one or more parties seek to
alter their jural relations,99 with the more familiar contentious forms that
parties use to resolve disputes over an existing relationship.  We conclude
this Part by showing that much domestic relations law calls for the issuance of
non-contentious, investitive decrees100 that do not fit well with the federal
courts’ limited authority to resolve “controversies” between citizens of differ-
ent states.
98 Id. at 1856–58 (“[F]ederal courts lack jurisdiction to decide uncontested divorces
since they do not constitute cases or controversies.”).
99 For a discussion on the effect of judgments with regards to parties’ jural relations,
see Edwin M. Borchard, The Declaratory Judgment—A Needed Procedural Reform, 28 YALE L.J. 1,
4 (1918) (stating that “all judgments of courts declare jural relations” but most are “fol-
lowed by further relief in the form of a judgment for the payment of damages or a decree
for an injunction”).  Divorce and other declarations of status stand in contrast to those
judgments that are followed by a decree ordering specific performance or payment of
damages. Id.  Judgments of divorce, as well as appointments of guardians, admissions of
wills to probate, and others, involve only a judgment that effects a change in status, thus
merely creating a “source of new jural relations.” Id.
100 The class of judgments that encapsulates divorce decrees involves only a change in
one’s status and has been labeled constitutive or investitive. Id. at 4–5; see also LORD WOOLF
& JEREMY WOOLF, THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 2 (3d ed. 2002) (distinguishing between
declarative judgments that can be enforced coercively and “constitutive-investitive” or
“divestitive” judgments that create a new legal relationship).  While divorce decrees fall
within the class of investitive judgments, some have stated a better term would be “divesti-
tive” because the judgment terminates an existing, as well as creates a new, status.  Edwin
M. Borchard, Judicial Relief for Peril and Insecurity, 45 HARV. L. REV. 793, 800 n.17 (1932)
(“Perhaps a more accurate nomenclature might use the term ‘divestitive’ for those judg-
ments, like the annulment of a voidable marriage or dissolution of partnership, which
merely terminate an existing status.”).
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A. A Brief History of Anglo-American Family Law
While the institution of marriage performs a range of functions in soci-
ety, we focus here on the fundamental change in legal status that occurs
when two people make a voluntary decision to enter into what has come to
be known as the marital estate.101  Common law rules defined the power of a
married couple to own, acquire, and dispose of property;102 common law
defined the obligations that a married woman owed to her husband and the
duties of support that her husband owed her in return.103  The children of
the marriage were assigned correlative rights and obligations, enjoying (at
least in theory) a right to financial support104 and owing services to their
parents until they reached majority.105  Law answered a range of related
questions: it defined the (limited) rights of illegitimate children,106 specified
how the couple’s property was to be distributed on the occasion of their
death,107 and called for the appointment of guardians to manage the prop-
erty of children who lacked any other legal guardian.108
No wonder, then, that the formalities of lawful marriage were, as a mat-
ter of history, most closely attended to by those with property.  In medieval
England, it was primarily the relatively well-to-do who sought to ensure that
their marriages were legally binding; only those with landed property would
concern themselves with securing the legal clarity that came with lawful mar-
101 Although the word “marriage” has many definitions, our focus is on the status of
marriage “imposed on the parties by the law as the consequence of their agreement of
present marriage . . . .”  1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES ON MARRIAGE,
DIVORCE, AND SEPARATION AS TO THE LAW, EVIDENCE, PLEADING, PRACTICE, FORMS AND THE
EVIDENCE OF MARRIAGE IN ALL ISSUES ON A NEW SYSTEM OF LEGAL EXPOSITION § 9 (Chi., T.H.
Flood & Co. 1891) [hereinafter 1 BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES] (discussing the meanings
of marriage).  For recognition of the estate-like quality of domestic relations, see Jones v.
Brennan, 465 F.3d 304, 307 (7th Cir. 2006) (likening disputes over the marital estate to an
in rem proceeding).
102 1 BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES, supra note 101, §§ 15–16 (discussing the effect of
marital status on property rights).
103 Id. § 1184 (explaining that by the rules of common law, “marriage confers on the
husband the right to the companionship and services of the wife, and compels him to
protect and support her”); id. § 1195 (describing the husband as “the head of the family”);
see also NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 11 (2000)
(the obligations owed to each spouse were set by the common law); HARTOG, supra note
16, at 136 (“Being a husband meant that one possessed, one represented, one governed,
one cared for.”).
104 BISHOP, supra note 14, § 39 (“The husband is under obligation to support his wife;
so is he to support his children.”).
105 See GROSSBERG, supra note 15, at 234 (discussing the role of a parent to control the
minor in the child custody context).
106 Id. at 197–201 (noting the evolution of bastard rights through post-Revolutionary
America).
107 1 BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES, supra note 101, at § 16.
108 See generally HELMHOLZ, supra note 30, at 243.
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riage.109  For many of the rest, customary forms of cohabitation were the
norm.  During the eleventh century, historians tell us, casual polygamy and
unregulated divorce were quite widespread and church weddings quite unu-
sual.110  By the thirteenth century, the Church had come to exercise greater
control of marriage law, in part because the local church courts played an
important recordkeeping function.111  Local parishes tried to keep track of
births, deaths, and marriages; local ecclesiastical courts were called upon to
sort out the complex questions of probate and intestate succession that arose
at death.112  One can thus see England’s marriage law of 1753113 as an
attempt to improve local marriage records by encouraging the celebration of
church weddings.114
If entry into the marital estate was accomplished through the voluntary
and public exchange of vows,115 then the alteration or termination of the
estate was a much more complicated business.  The common law took seri-
ously the admonition that marriage contracts were meant to last a lifetime.116
As a result, legal forms of divorce were for the most part unavailable.  True,
the ecclesiastical courts had the power to grant a limited form of divorce,
known as separation from bed and board,117 but the marriage continued in
109 See LAWRENCE STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND 1500–1800, at
30–31 (1977) (describing marriage as concerning a property exchange among the wealthy
and as a private contract between those without property); see also MARY ANN GLENDON,
THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 104–05 (1981) (the presence of an official at the
marriage was important only to those who had property so as to be certain of the status
change that ultimately affected the division of property as a result of death or divorce);
SCOT PETERSON & IAIN MCLEAN, LEGALLY MARRIED: LOVE AND LAW IN THE UK AND THE US
61 (2013) (the formal steps of marriage were not common among the poor “who had little
need for the formalities that governed the succession of titles and property”).
110 STONE, supra note 109, at 30 (“Up to the eleventh century, casual polygamy seems to
have been general, with easy divorce and much concubinage.”).
111 Id. at 30; see also OUTHWAITE, supra note 42, at 8–9 (noting that court officials
derived income from the issuance of licenses and that, after the Reformation, a major
source of income came from the issuance of marriage licenses in particular).
112 The introduction of marriage, birth, and death records was evidence of a tightening
of clerical controls over matters that most often ended up in ecclesiastical courts. See
STONE, supra note 23, at 383.
113 An Act for the Better Preventing of Clandestine Marriages 1753, 26 Geo. 2 c. 33
(Eng.) (also called Lord Hardwicke’s Marriage Act).
114 For a discussion of Lord Hardwicke’s Marriage Act, see Hazel D. Lord, Husband and
Wife: English Marriage Law from 1750: A Bibliographical Essay, 11 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S
STUD. 1, 6–11 (2001).
115 In the central Middle Ages, it was established that consent created a marriage
between two people. See CONOR MCCARTHY, MARRIAGE IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND: LAW, LITERA-
TURE AND PRACTICE 19 (2004).  A priest, however, was taught not to marry persons without
making a public announcement of the marriage, i.e., banns. Id. at 27.
116 See, e.g., 1 BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES, supra note 101, at § 40 (describing marriage
under common law as “a union for life”).
117 Ecclesiastical jurisdiction allowed those courts to proclaim a marriage void ab initio
and to grant a divorce a mensa et thoro (from bed and board). See HOLDSWORTH, supra note
29, at 622–23.
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force and duties of support and dower rights survived such decrees.118  In
addition, certain marriages were terminated as nullities, either because the
parties were too closely related or because they could not consummate the
marriage.119  Such absolute divorces dissolved the marriage and left the par-
ties free to remarry.  Outside these circumstances, only Parliament had the
power to grant an absolute divorce.120  Yet securing a private legislative
divorce bill was a time-consuming and expensive endeavor practically availa-
ble only to the aristocracy and to those with substantial means.121
Questions concerning the custody and guardianship of children arose as
incidents to marriage, divorce, and death.  The parents of a child were con-
sidered lawful guardians,122 but the parents’ death (or incompetence) would
necessitate the appointment of a substitute.  The task of appointing guardi-
ans in England fell to the High Court of Chancery, exercising the prerogative
powers of the Crown.123  Custody was a different matter.  English law natu-
rally assigned custody to the child’s parents;124 custody arose as an issue in
ecclesiastical courts only in those instances when the minor asserted rights,
or potential rights, to part of a decedent’s estate.125  Thus the reach of eccle-
siastical courts over minors was tied up in their exercise of probate jurisdic-
tion.  Property settlements, alimony, and other support obligations were
118 Alimony awarded by ecclesiastical courts after a divorce from bed and board
“merely constituted a recognition and enforcement of the husband’s duty to support the
wife which continued after the judicial separation.” HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF
DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 619 (2d ed. 1987).
119 1 BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES, supra note 101, at §§ 472, 473 (defining nullity of a
marriage); see also TAPPING REEVE, THE LAW OF BARON AND FEMME 316–20 (Albany, William
Gould 3d ed. 1862) (1816) (discussing the Levitical degrees of marriage and divorce ab
initio).
120 See HOLDSWORTH, supra note 29, at 623 (discussing the introduction of divorce by
private act of Parliament arising at the end of the seventeenth century, and the steps neces-
sary to obtain such a divorce); STONE, supra note 23, at 141 (describing two roads to
divorce, the first by suing for separation in ecclesiastical court and the second by act of
Parliament).
121 Because of the expense, parliamentary divorce was rare, with only 131 such acts
passed between 1670 and 1799. STONE, supra note 23, at 34.
122 In England, the father was considered the common law guardian of his minor chil-
dren.  1 BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES, supra note 101, § 1152.  The mother obtained guardi-
anship only upon the father’s death and did so “not to its full extent.” Id. § 1153.
123 See CHITTY, supra note 21, at 155–56.  The king, in his position as parens patriae, was
the legal guardian of his people.  His power over infants was delegated to the lord chancel-
lor who then was able to appoint guardians through exercising the prerogatives of the
king. Id.
124 Custody was historically granted first to the father and then the mother.  In either
instance, parents could not “by any contract not expressly authorized by law cast off perma-
nently, whatever temporary arrangements they may make, the personal duty and correlate
right of [the child’s] custody and support.”  1 BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES, supra note 101,
§ 1169 (footnote omitted).
125 See HELMHOLZ, supra note 30, at 243.
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adjusted to take account of the cost of raising children.126  Absolute divorce
was thought to terminate the marital estate127 and had far-reaching conse-
quences for the children of the severed union.  The common law treated
such children as illegitimate and deemed them incapable of inheriting the
landed property of their parents.128
The American colonies adapted these English institutions as best they
could to a world where church courts were virtually nonexistent.129  The col-
onies established a variety of specialized tribunals—probate courts, orphan’s
courts, and the like—to administer the law of marriage, divorce, custody, and
guardianship and to sort out competing property claims at death.130  Church
weddings were common and legally effective, but marriage remained an
estate that was available to those who voluntarily exchanged public vows.131
Divorce was similarly constrained; colonial courts would grant a divorce from
bed and board but would typically refrain from entering an absolute divorce
decree.132  As did the Parliament in England, some colonial legislatures
viewed themselves as authorized to grant an absolute divorce through private
bill.133  Recordkeeping remained a problem; state legislatures did not adopt
126 Although ecclesiastical courts were without jurisdiction to determine custody in
divorce suits, they were able to adjust alimony awards with the custody of the child in mind.
1 BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES, supra note 101, § 1185.
127 Id. § 1623.  An absolute divorce makes both spouses “single, freeing them as effectu-
ally from the marriage bond as does the sentence of nullity.” Id.
128 See id. §§ 1601, 1602 (naming as legitimate only those children born in wedlock
including those begotten prior to wedlock and born after the marriage is dissolved but
stating that no others are legitimate; children of a divorce decreed null are “conclusively
illegitimate”).
129 For a discussion of church-state relations in colonial America, see Elizabeth B.
Clark, Church-State Relations in the Constitution-Making Period, in CHURCH AND STATE IN
AMERICA: A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL GUIDE 151 (John F. Wilson ed., 1986).
130 See Erwin C. Surrency, The Evolution of an Urban Judicial System: The Philadelphia Story,
1683 to 1968, 18 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 95, 97 (1974) (“An orphan’s court had earlier been
established in each colony to safeguard the estates of orphans and to supervise their wel-
fare . . . .”); Winkler, supra note 46, at 91 (describing the varied powers of the colonial
probate courts).
131 See COTT, supra note 103, at 39 (noting that proper marriage ceremonies were more
common after 1750 but that judges were inclined to find informal marriages valid so long
as the consent of the parties was clearly demonstrated); GROSSBERG, supra note 15, at 64–69
(although “[c]ouples who observed nuptial formalities assured themselves of all the rights
and privileges of matrimonial status,” many early marriages did not take place in a church
or were otherwise recorded).
132 See HARTOG, supra note 16, at 70 (stating that “[p]rior to the American Revolution,
absolute divorces . . . had been available only in the New England colonies”).
133 Absolute divorce by way of a special act of the legislature was prominent as late as
the mid-nineteenth century. See WRIGHT, supra note 23, at 77 (describing the methods of
divorce in the states); see also COTT, supra note 103, at 50–51 (explaining that early in the
nineteenth century nearly all state legislatures entertained petitions for divorce).
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marriage licensure requirements until the mid-nineteenth century.134  Geo-
graphic mobility and the prospect of new land ownership (and a new life) on
the frontier loosened the bonds of many marriages that were never formally
dissolved.135
B. The Limited Non-Contentious Power of Federal Courts
We now shift gears, slightly, from the history of marriage to the almost
equally ancient history of non-contentious jurisdiction.  Though likely unfa-
miliar to modern Americans steeped in the adversarial tradition,136 non-con-
tentious jurisdiction arose in Roman law as a mode of procedure by which
courts would register a claim or certify a change in legal status on an uncon-
tested basis.  Instead of resolving a dispute (as they did in the exercise of
their contentious jurisdiction), Roman tribunals and the European courts
that received Roman law into their procedural codes acted in non-conten-
tious jurisdiction to provide official recognition and approval of a desired
change in status.137  Thus, issues of adoption, manumission, and emancipa-
tion were all handled in Roman law on a non-contentious basis.138  Courts
bore responsibility for conducting their own investigation into the facts and
for issuing a decree that would provide an official record of the desired
change in status.  The task at hand was fundamentally administrative and
investitive as the courts’ decree altered the jural relations of the party or par-
ties applying for the order.139  In proceeding on a non-contentious basis, the
courts did not view themselves as resolving a dispute between the parties over
an existing status or state of affairs.  Instead, the courts were effecting a
change in status or certifying the validity of a claim of right under applicable
134 WRIGHT, supra note 23, at 46; see also GROSSBERG, supra note 15, at 77–78 (discussing
the emergence of marriage licenses in the nineteenth century as a method of public
surveillance).
135 See COTT, supra note 103, at 48 (noting that the prevalence of informal marriage led
to “self-divorce” among those with no record of their marriage).
136 The Supreme Court has long held that federal courts may only hear concrete con-
troversies that involve “the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.”  Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240–41 (1937); see also Bond v. United States, 564
U.S. 211, 217 (2011) (stating that one who seeks to bring a proceeding in federal court
must demonstrate an interest in the suit “on the part of the opposing party that is sufficient
to establish ‘concrete adverseness’” (quoting Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 701
(2011))).
137 Roman law appears to have divided judicial actions into iurisdictio contentiosa and
iurisdictio voluntaria, i.e., contentious and voluntary jurisdiction. ADOLF BERGER, TRANSAC-
TIONS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY 524 (1953).  Matters within iurisdictio
voluntaria arose from the desire of the parties to secure legal recognition of their status.
Id.
138 For a more detailed discussion on the invocation of non-contentious jurisdiction in
Roman law, see Pfander & Birk, supra note 11, at 1403–06.
139 See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text.
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law,140 much the way an administrative agency today might pass on an appli-
cation for social security benefits.
Despite its roots in the non-adversarial European practice of inquisitorial
judging, in which the courts bore responsibility for factual investigation and
adversary assumptions did not apply, the tradition of non-contentious juris-
diction made its way to the new world and onto the dockets of the federal
courts created under Article III.  As one of us has explained elsewhere, the
early Congresses assigned lower federal courts a broad collection of non-con-
tentious work.141  Thus, Congress directed aliens seeking naturalized citizen-
ship to file ex parte petitions with the federal courts, together with materials
showing they were qualified for naturalization under the terms of federal
law.142  If they found it appropriate based on the submission and their own
investigation, federal courts were expected to issue orders of record that
would provide official evidence of the naturalized alien’s new status as a citi-
zen.143  Similarly non-contentious proceedings unfolded in federal courts
when veterans pursued pension claims, when government officials sought a
warrant to search specified premises, and when private sailors, known as pri-
vateers, brought admiralty proceedings to register their legal claim to an
enemy vessel captured as a prize in the course of seagoing warfare with
another country.  Other examples abound.144
While the federal courts were quite willing to entertain uncontested
applications to register claims of right or changes in status under federal law,
they displayed a very different attitude towards investitive applications
grounded in state law.  Consider, for example, the so-called probate excep-
tion, under which federal courts decline to hear certain matters relating to
140 Courts working such a change in status performed this function “not by coercive
decrees, but in removing uncertainty by establishing and confirming existing rights with-
out necessarily attributing a wrong to anybody.” See Borchard, supra note 100, at 796.  The
resulting litigation is “a mere declaration of the rights of the parties.” Id.
141 See Pfander & Birk, supra note 11, at 1359–67 (listing government benefits, naturali-
zation proceedings, and Revolutionary War pension claims, among others, as non-conten-
tious work assigned to lower federal courts).
142 The first naturalization act provided for an applicant to submit a petition to “any
common law court of record.”  Act of March 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103 (repealed
1795).  The subsequent naturalization act explicitly conferred concurrent authority on
state and lower federal courts to hear naturalization petitions. See An Act to Establish an
Uniform Rule of Naturalization; and to Repeal the Act Heretofore Passed on that Subject,
ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 414 (1795) (repealed 1802).
143 After concluding that the applicant for naturalization made the proper showing, the
Act called upon the court to administer an oath after which the clerk was to record the
application and proceedings so as to memorialize the court’s conclusion.  Act of March 26,
1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (repealed 1795).
144 Thus, Congress provided for pension benefit claimants to file ex parte applications
in the federal courts, called upon revenue officials to seek by ex parte petition a warrant to
search premises suspected to be harboring tax evading distilleries, and authorized federal
courts to issue decrees of good prize in uncontested applications. See generally Pfander &
Birk, supra note 11, at 1364–65, 1368, 1377.
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the probate of wills and decedent’s estates.145  While commentators have put
forward a variety of theories to explain why the federal courts came to recog-
nize a “probate exception” to federal judicial power,146 we think the answer
lies in the non-contentious or investitive character of many features of pro-
bate law.  As one of us explained in greater detail in a recent paper, many so-
called “common form” probate matters begin with an uncontested petition
for the proof or probate of the will.147  If the court agrees that the will meets
the basic formalities required by law, the court admits the will to probate and
appoints an administrator to manage the estate.  This decree effectively
invests the administrator with new powers to manage the estate, to distribute
the assets in accordance with the terms of the will, and to secure a measure of
protection from liability based on actions taken in the course of
administration.
Article III makes no provision for the federal courts to decree as to mat-
ters of state law in uncontested proceedings, an omission that we think
explains (a narrow version of) both the probate and domestic relations
exceptions.  To be sure, Article III extends the judicial power to “[c]ases”
arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, and
“[c]ases” of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,148 and thus provides ample
authority for the federal courts to entertain uncontested or non-contentious
applications that seek to register a claim of right under federal law.  Thus,
Congress can freely assign the federal courts power over uncontested natural-
ization petitions, pension applications, prize claims, and other matters of fed-
eral law.  But it takes a “controversy” between adverse parties, aligned as
specified in Article III, to ground the jurisdiction of the federal courts over
matters of state law.  Just as an uncontested application for the admission of a
will to probate does not present a “controversy,”149 so too do many of the
investitive features of domestic relations law fail to satisfy the controversy
requirement of Article III.
The suggestion that Article III “cases” embrace original applications for
the exercise of non-contentious jurisdiction in matters governed by federal
law and that “controversies” encompass only genuine disputes between prop-
145 For the Court’s latest treatment of the probate exception, see Marshall v. Marshall,
547 U.S. 293 (2006) (limiting the probate exception to the admissions of wills to probate,
and the administration of probate estates).
146 See, e.g., id. at 306–08 (linking the probate exception to the Judiciary Act of 1789);
Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 584 (1962) (offering a federalism-based limitation on
the exercise of jurisdiction over probate issues); Winkler, supra note 46, at 78 (arguing that
the probate exception is “a myth of federal law” and that limits that “apply generally to
federal jurisdiction” will often “restrict such actions”).
147 Pfander & Downey, supra note 13, at 1553.
148 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
149 The Supreme Court has noted that the absence of adverse parties in a probate pro-
ceeding may prevent the federal courts from entertaining such a suit. See Ellis v. Davis, 109
U.S. 485, 497 (1883) (noting that jurisdiction as to wills cannot be exercised by federal
courts until “its exercise becomes necessary to settle a controversy of which a court of the
United States may take cognizance by reason of the citizenship of the parties”).
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erly aligned adversaries enjoys surprisingly strong support in the decisional
law of the nineteenth century.  Consider first Chief Justice Marshall’s iconic
account in Osborn v. Bank of the United States of the meaning of the term
“cases” arising under federal law in Article III:
 [Article III’s grant of jurisdiction over federal question cases] enables the
judicial department to receive jurisdiction to the full extent of the constitu-
tion, laws, and treaties of the United States, when any question respecting
them shall assume such a form that the judicial power is capable of acting on
it.  That power is capable of acting only when the subject is submitted to it by
a party who asserts his rights in the form prescribed by law.150
Here, Marshall phrases the definition of cases in terms of a claim of right
submitted in the form prescribed by law (much the same definition that
Brandeis was to put forward a century later in defending the judicial power
over uncontested naturalization petitions).151  Unlike the modern Supreme
Court, Marshall did not limit the exercise of judicial power to parties who
have suffered an injury in fact152 and he did not specify the need for the
joinder of an adverse party.153  Marshall had, after all, presided over chal-
lenges to naturalization decrees himself, ruling that such judgments were
binding adjudications of a claim of right and were not subject to collateral
attack.154
On the other hand, the Court was unwilling to entertain original non-
contentious matters rooted in state law.  (To be sure, ancillary non-conten-
tious proceedings governed by state law often take place in the shadow of an
adverse party dispute.)  Consider the explanation of the probate exception in
Gaines v. Fuentes,155 which arose from the attempted removal to federal court
150 Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 819 (1824).  Chief Justice Mar-
shall’s definitions of a “suit” in Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449, 464
(1829) (“any proceeding in a court of justice, by which an individual pursues that remedy
in a court of justice, which the law affords him”), and in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264, 408 (1821) (“all cases were [sic] the party suing claims to obtain something to
which he has a right”), echo these elements.  Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution adopts
the same formulation: “A case, then, in the sense of this clause of the Constitution, arises
when some subject touching the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States is sub-
mitted to the courts by a party who asserts his rights in the form prescribed by law.”  2
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 452 (Bos., Lit-
tle, Brown & Co. 5th ed. 1891) (1833).
151 See Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568 (1926).
152 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (stating that the “consti-
tutional minimum of standing” requires, among other elements, an “injury in fact”).
153 See Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 348 (1980) (describing the
“continuing controversy between adverse parties” as a constitutional limitation in order to
confer standing on appeal).
154 See, e.g., Spratt v. Spratt, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 393, 408 (1830) (treating the naturalization
record of James Spratt as conclusive); see also Stark v. Chesapeake Ins. Co., 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 420 (1813) (viewing the judgment of naturalization by the court of record as
conclusive); Campbell v. Gordon, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 176 (1810) (same); McCarthy v.
Marsh, 5 N.Y. 263 (1851) (same).
155 92 U.S. 10 (1875).
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of a state suit concerning the validity of a Louisiana landowner’s will.  In
upholding removal, the Court explained that:
The Constitution imposes no limitation upon the class of cases involving
controversies between citizens of different States, to which the judicial power
of the United States may be extended; and Congress may, therefore, lawfully
provide for bringing, at the option of either of the parties, all such contro-
versies within the jurisdiction of the Federal judiciary. . . .
. . . .
There are, it is true, in several decisions of this court, expressions of
opinion that the Federal courts have no probate jurisdiction, referring par-
ticularly to the establishment of wills; and such is undoubtedly the case
under the existing legislation of Congress.  The reason lies in the nature of
the proceeding to probate a will as one in rem, which does not necessarily
involve any controversy between parties: indeed, in the majority of instances,
no such controversy exists. . . . [B]ut whenever a controversy in a suit
between such parties arises respecting the validity or construction of a will,
or the enforcement of a decree admitting it to probate, there is no more
reason why the Federal courts should not take jurisdiction of the case than
there is that they should not take jurisdiction of any other controversy
between the parties.156
Other cases from the period echo this idea that it takes a controversy to
ground federal jurisdiction over matters rooted in state probate law.157
It thus appears that nineteenth-century jurists distinguished between
“cases” in Article III (those arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties
of the United States and those of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction) and
“controversies” between parties specified in Article III.  As for cases, nine-
teenth-century opinion held that a simple application to a federal court to
assert a federal claim of right in the forms prescribed by law was all that was
required.  This formulation was broad enough to encompass both disputes
between opposing parties (contentious jurisdiction) and original applica-
tions for non-contentious relief, such as petitions for naturalization.  Parties
invoking federal judicial power over “controversies,” by contrast, were seem-
ingly required to present the court with a claim against one of the opposing
parties specified in Article III.  Federal courts could not, in short, exercise
investitive non-contentious jurisdiction over matters rooted in state law.  We
think, as the next Section explains, that the core features of the domestic
relations exception can be explained by reference to the non-contentious
nature of the judicial power that such matters call upon the courts to exer-
cise.  Article III power over controversies was not understood to extend to
such matters.
156 Id. at 18, 21–22.
157 See Ellis v. Davis, 109 U.S. 485, 497 (1883) (linking “[j]urisdiction as to wills, and
their probate as such . . . [to the necessity] to settle a controversy of which a court of the
United States may take cognizance by reason of the citizenship of the parties”).
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C. The Investitive Character of Domestic Relations Law
Forms of proceeding commonly deployed in connection with the con-
struction and legal administration of family relations in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries display a non-contentious investitive quality.  Entry into
marriage, a matter of contract158 that became legally effective when the par-
ties publicly exchanged vows and observed other solemnities, principally
operated to change the parties’ legal status.159  A legal marriage, as we have
seen, vested the husband with control of property and imposed correlative
duties of support that ran in favor of the husband’s dependents.160  Marriage
was not viewed as an inherently judicial act; parties were free to celebrate
marriage in churches and in other less formal settings.161  But justices of the
peace were frequently called upon to perform marriage ceremonies and state
courts and their delegates continue to preside over such ceremonies today.
Whatever one might say about those ceremonies (and the drama that some-
times surrounds them), they do not present litigable controversies between
parties from different states and do not obviously fall within the scope of
federal diversity jurisdiction as defined in Article III or in the Judiciary Act of
1789.  Marriage thus surely represents a non-contentious act162 to which the
federal judicial power over “controversies” does not extend.
158 Though marriage was sometimes described as a private civil contract, it was “some-
thing more than a mere contract.” See GROSSBERG, supra note 15, at 21 (quoting JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 170 n.3 (London, A. Maxwell 2d ed.
1841) (1834)).
159 See BISHOP, supra note 14, § 29 (noting that though marriage is denominated a con-
tract in legal writings, it is viewed primarily as a change in status).
160 See supra notes 89–92 and accompanying text.
161 Although marriage law in England changed with the passage of Lord Hardwicke’s
Marriage Act in 1753, up through that point a marriage union “could be created solely by
the consent of the two parties expressed in words of the present tense.” MARTIN INGRAM,
CHURCH COURTS, SEX AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND, 1570–1640, at 132 (1987).  Solemnisa-
tion in church or the use of specific words or oaths was not required to create a legally
viable marriage. Id.  Marital practices were equally as varied among Americans in the Rev-
olutionary era.  While state legislatures often sought to dictate the marital relationship,
informal marriages in the states were common. See COTT, supra note 103, at 24–31.  The
acceptance, by both the community as well as the judiciary, of these informal marriages
“testified to the widespread belief that the parties’ consent to marry each other, not the
words said by a minister or magistrate, mattered most.” Id. at 31.
162 One scholar divided the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts into three catego-
ries: instance, office or record, and non-contentious business. See INGRAM, supra note 161,
at 43.  The issuance of marriage licenses, as well as probates and administrations, were
“administrative business in quasi-judicial guise: it requires little explanatory comment,
though it formed an extremely important part of the church courts’ work.” Id. The cate-
gories of “[i]nstance” and “office” jurisdiction, however, may be roughly equated with work
one would categorize as civil and criminal. Id.  Instance causes were disputes that arose
between parties who believed they had been wronged whereas office cases were discipli-
nary actions having to do with a party’s moral health. Id.  Issuance of marriage licenses,
then, stands apart as a function of the ecclesiastical court’s non-contentious work.
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Contested divorce presents a different situation, needless to say.  Here,
the parties may disagree both as to whether grounds for divorce exist and as
to whether they wish to redefine or terminate their marital status.  But, as
others have noticed, in a nineteenth-century world that more or less automat-
ically assigned husband and wife a common domicile and state of citizen-
ship,163 it would be quite unusual for the parties to satisfy Article III’s
provision for jurisdiction over controversies between citizens of different
states.  Shared marital domicile at the time divorce proceedings arose would
foreclose, in almost every instance, any possibility of predicating federal juris-
diction on disparate state citizenship.164  What’s more, the codification of
diversity in the Judiciary Act imposed an amount in controversy requirement
that some divorce contests might not satisfy.165  While divorce proceedings
might otherwise satisfy the “controversy” requirement of Article III, in short,
we think it would be a most unusual dispute indeed that would satisfy the
diversity requirement.  Still, we would not rule out the exercise of diversity
jurisdiction over a divorce proceeding, if the other elements of jurisdiction
were satisfied (just as we would not rule out federal power over a will contest
that satisfied the requisites of diversity).
Courts make a number of incidental decisions in the course of divorce
proceedings: they divide marital property, make child custody determina-
tions, impose alimony and child support obligations, and otherwise adminis-
ter and unwind the marital and familial relationships.166  We think the
federal courts could constitutionally exercise these incidental powers, assum-
ing that they enjoyed jurisdiction over the divorce controversy itself.  Federal
courts play a variety of non-contentious roles in the context of diversity litiga-
tion, when the presence of a dispute between citizens of different states
grounds federal jurisdiction and brings into play the power of the federal
163 See BLACKSTONE, supra note 32, at *430, *442–45 (“By marriage, the husband and
wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is sus-
pended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated or consolidated into that of the
husband: under whose wing [and] protection . . . she performs every thing . . . .” (footnote
omitted)).
164 Justice Daniel, dissenting in Barber v. Barber, noted that the condition of marriage
itself whereby man and woman become a single legal entity, did not allow for separate
domiciles and so diversity jurisdiction could not exist.  62 U.S. 582, 600–01 (1858) (Daniel,
J., dissenting).
165 See De La Rama v. De La Rama, 201 U.S. 303, 307 (1906) (noting that federal courts
lack jurisdiction for divorce suits both by reason that the “husband and wife cannot usually
be citizens of different States, so long as the marriage relation continues . . . and for the
further reason that a suit for divorce in itself involves no pecuniary value”).
166 A typical divorce proceeding may include the divorce decree itself, issuance of ali-
mony, child support, and a custody decree. See, e.g., Wilbanks v. Wilbanks, 234 S.E.2d 915
(Ga. 1977) (upholding a trial court order in a divorce action granting the wife temporary
alimony, child custody, and child support).  Some state courts, however, may bifurcate pro-
ceedings involving divorce and child custody. See James Burd, Note, Splitting the Marriage in
More Ways Than One: Bifurcation of Divorce Proceedings, 30 J. FAM. L. 903 (1992) (outlining
the availability of bifurcation in different states).  The decision to bifurcate remains in the
discretion of the court in most jurisdictions. Id. at 904.
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courts to conduct proceedings ancillary to the resolution of that dispute.167
Thus, federal courts in the nineteenth century frequently exercised jurisdic-
tion over equity receiverships, and thus played an important role in adminis-
tering the assets of insolvent firms.168  But the exercise of such jurisdiction
depended on the presence of a controversy between a creditor and debtor
from different states.  As with equitable receiverships, then, the ancillary fed-
eral power to administer a marital estate would depend, in our view, on the
existence of a cognizable dispute between the parties that would ground the
federal court’s jurisdiction in the first instance.
In most cases, however, the absence of diversity will foreclose the federal
courts from hearing the divorce and will disable the courts from entertaining
the matters of administration that arise as incidents to the divorce.  For two
reasons, we do not think the federal courts can take up these matters of
administration without jurisdiction over the divorce itself.  First, and some-
what abstractly, we think many of these matters represent issues of non-con-
tentious investitive jurisdiction that proceed in the absence of contestation
and seek to effect a change in status or obligation.169  Without a controversy
to ground federal power, non-contentious incidents lie beyond federal cogni-
zance.  Second, and more concretely, we think the mind of the nineteenth-
century jurist adhered rather tenaciously to a conception of equitable prior-
ity in which the first court vested with jurisdiction over a dispute that entailed
forms of equitable administration was viewed as empowered to adjust all mat-
ters, to the exclusion of the duplicative claims of an alternative judiciary.170
One can see these ideas of equitable priority reflected in the wholly com-
monplace nineteenth-century idea that the first court to secure in rem juris-
diction over a specific estate or form of property was entitled to maintain its
jurisdiction to the exclusion of other tribunals.171  This power to maintain
priority and jurisdiction can be seen as nicely illustrated by the in rem/in
personam distinction that the Court drew upon in Kline v. Burke Construction
167 For a discussion of federal courts’ original and ancillary non-contentious jurisdic-
tion, see Pfander & Birk, supra note 11, at 1440–41.
168 See id. at 1371–73, 1386 (discussing the federal courts’ administration of equity
receiverships).
169 Non-contentious or collusive divorces were an arrangement by which parties mutu-
ally agreed to a divorce but, because of the mandate of the times, were not able to legally
obtain a no-fault divorce.  Thus, the husband and wife worked together to prepare the
ground for a divorce. See STONE, supra note 23, at 183.  Even in those instances where a
collusive divorce was not sought, the granting of a divorce can be considered as no more
than a change in the parties’ legal status.  So far as a judgment declares a marriage null at
the request of a party, it may be considered investitive or constitutive, i.e., a change in
status, and no more, has been effected. See Borchard, supra note 99, at 4–5.
170 For an account of equitable priority in the context of the Anti-Injunction Act, see
James E. Pfander & Nassim Nazemi, The Anti-Injunction Act and the Problem of Federal-State
Jurisdictional Overlap, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2013).
171 See id. at 28–31 (discussing the res exception to the Anti-Injunction Act as operating
to ensure equitable priority such that when a “court of equity has been properly empow-
ered to take control of property, broadly defined, the state court cannot interfere” and vice
versa).
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Co.172  There, a federal plaintiff sought to enjoin a duplicative state court
proceeding on the ground that the state judgment could claim-preclude fur-
ther federal litigation.173  The Supreme Court refused to allow an injunction
against state proceedings, emphasizing that the dueling lawsuits were in the
nature of in personam proceedings as to which no equitable priority
arose.174  The Court quite deliberately distinguished in rem proceedings,
where one court first obtains jurisdiction over a res and proceeds to resolve
conflicting claims to that res free from the interference of other courts.
Injunctions might issue to defend equitable priority over property (such as
the priority a court might secure as the forum for an action to impose an
equity receivership on defendant’s property) but were generally unavailable
to defend first-to-file priority in in personam actions.175
Nineteenth-century wisdom held that the marital estate constituted a
bundle of property rights176 to which the rules of equitable priority applied.
Thus, nineteenth-century treatises on the law of conflicts and jurisdiction
characterized the marital relationship as a form of status and treated divorce
suits to alter that status as in rem or quasi in rem in nature.177  In keeping
with the territoriality of the age, jurists naturally assumed that judicial power
over divorce proceedings fell to the courts of the state in which the marital
domicile of the parties was located.178  Thus, the Court in Pennoyer v. Neff
explained that every state court enjoys jurisdiction (regardless of personal
service) “to determine the civil status and capacities of all its inhabitants” and
may prescribe conditions “on which proceedings affecting them may be com-
menced” within its territory.179  This conception of divorce as an in rem pro-
ceeding on an issue of status enabled the Court to recognize the continuing
172 260 U.S. 226 (1922).
173 Id. at 228.
174 Id. at 230.
175 Id.  The Court noted that a mere controversy “is not a thing, and a controversy over
a mere question of personal liability does not involve the possession or control of a thing,
and an action brought to enforce such a liability does not tend to impair or defeat the
jurisdiction of the court in which a prior action for the same cause is pending.” Id.
176 See, e.g., GROSSBERG, supra note 15, at 235 (discussing children born in a marriage as
“subordinate beings, assets of estates in which fathers had a vested right”).
177 See 2 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 119.1 (1935) (defin-
ing status as “a personal quality or relationship, not temporary in its nature nor terminable
at the mere will of the parties, with which third persons and the state are concerned” and
citing marriage as an example of such status); see also RALEIGH C. MINOR, CONFLICT OF
LAWS; OR, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW § 84 (1901) (distinguishing between in personam
and in rem proceedings and classifying divorce as in rem).  A proceeding in rem is aimed
at an individual’s property or some other thing within the power and jurisdiction of the
court.  Because the subject matter of divorce suits is the marriage status itself, it is thus
properly characterized as an in rem proceeding. Id.
178 See Rhonda Wasserman, Parents, Partners, and Personal Jurisdiction, 1995 U. ILL. L.
REV. 813, 815-16 (discussing the history of state court jurisdiction over status
determinations).
179 95 U.S. 714, 734 (1877) (emphasis omitted).
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power of the courts of the marital domicile to decree a divorce even after one
party to the marital relationship had left the territory.180
Understanding the marital estate as a res and the divorce proceeding as
quasi in rem, we can better understand why nineteenth-century jurists did
not see a role for inter partes actions brought in federal diversity jurisdiction.
The separation of the spouses’ marital domiciles typically took place after the
divorce was completed and the parties established separate households.
Once the divorce was underway in state courts, moreover, the federal judici-
ary may have viewed the matter as one of equitable priority in which matters
of custody, alimony, and support were viewed as incidental to the divorce
decree.  Standard rules of deference would have cautioned the federal courts
to refrain from entertaining a proceeding that could threaten the state
court’s control of these necessarily related matters.  Thus, the court’s deter-
mination of fault in the divorce proceeding could influence its child custody
decision and those decisions in turn could influence the judicial determina-
tion of alimony and child support obligations.  Administration of the marital
estate thus seems to have entailed unitary adjudication of the range of issues
that arose in the context of a divorce.181
Once the divorce was completed and separate households were estab-
lished across state lines, the parties could prosecute their disputes within fed-
eral diversity jurisdiction.  Indeed, the leading nineteenth-century case on
the scope of the domestic relations exception arose from just such a post-
divorce dispute.  In Barber v. Barber,182 the New York state courts granted the
wife a divorce and imposed an alimony duty on the husband, who later left to
establish a new home in Wisconsin.183  When he failed to pay, the wife
brought suit in diversity in Wisconsin, seeking to enforce the alimony obliga-
tion.  After reviewing the authorities, the Supreme Court allowed the action
to proceed on the basis that husband and wife now had separate domiciles
180 Id. (stating that a person domiciled in a state could seek a divorce from an absent
spouse because of the state’s power to determine the civil status of its inhabitants).
181 A parallel may be drawn to federal deference in probate proceedings.  In Byers v.
McAuley, for example, the Court overturned the lower federal court’s decision to impose
equitable administration on the estate of a decedent.  149 U.S. 608 (1893).  The Court
stated that, in an equity receivership “[p]osession of the res draws to the court having
possession all controversies concerning the res.” Id. at 619.  Because the Court viewed the
power to administer the decedent’s estate as arising from the power to appoint the admin-
istrator in the initial proceeding to admit the will to probate, the federal courts could not
take over the resulting administrative duties from the state courts.  If, however, the federal
courts were given original jurisdiction over the initial probate application, the court would
be empowered to “draw to itself all controversies affecting that the estate.” Id.  In the
absence of such original jurisdiction, the Court found that the rules of equitable priority
required deference to the state court; see also Pfander & Downey, supra note 13, at 1568–72
(discussing the probate exception in the nineteenth century).
182 62 U.S. 582 (1858).
183 Id. at 584.
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and states of citizenship and could satisfy the requirements of diversity.184
But the Court cautioned that the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts did
not extend to such investitive or status-related matters as the divorce pro-
ceeding itself, or the order granting alimony.185
In summary, then, our non-contentious account of the domestic rela-
tions exception rests on the idea that the federal courts lack the power to
administer state law in original non-contentious investitive proceedings.  Just
as a party seeking probate in the common form under state law must apply to
a state tribunal for the decree admitting the will to probate and investing the
administrator with formal power,186 so too must parties seeking consensual
investitive decrees in the state family law context pursue those matters before
state tribunals.  On the other hand, once the parties to a dispute over issues
of state family law satisfy the requisites for diversity jurisdiction, a federal
court has full power to adjudicate that dispute and to address any related
ancillary matters.  Historically speaking, the inability of the federal courts to
entertain non-contentious proceedings based on state law and the inability of
the members of a family to meet the requirements of diversity prevented
many family law matters from entering federal court.187  But as in Barber,
where a dispute arose between diverse citizens, Article III poses no obstacle
to federal adjudication.188  Similarly, when disputes over marriage, divorce,
or custody present federal questions, the federal courts may entertain them
as cases arising under federal law.  And if Congress were to federalize the law
of domestic relations, either by statute or treaty, the federal courts could
administer the law in non-contentious “cases” within the scope of Article III.
III. APPLYING THE NON-CONTENTIOUS ACCOUNT TO CURRENT PUZZLES
So far, we have tried to show that the non-contentious account helps to
explain the origin of the domestic relations exception and helps to make
sense of the otherwise curious disparity in the way the exception applies to
cases under federal law and controversies over state law.  In this Part, we
briefly summarize a variety of puzzles and anomalies in current scholarship
184 Id. at 597–98 (stating that sufficient authority had been cited to show “that a wife
under a judicial sentence of separation from bed and board is entitled to make a domicil
for herself, different from that of her husband”).
185 Id. at 584 (“We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the United
States upon the subject of divorce, or for the allowance of alimony, either as an original
proceeding in chancery or as an incident to divorce a vinculo, or to one from bed and
board.”).  The Court was careful to note at the outset of its opinion that the suit before it
was not asking for the allowance of alimony but the enforcement of an alimony decree
granted by a court of competent jurisdiction, a state court in New York. Id.
186 See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
187 See, e.g., De La Rama v. De La Rama, 201 U.S. 303, 307 (1906) (noting that divorces
involve no pecuniary value and husband and wife cannot usually be citizens of a different
state).
188 62 U.S. 582 (1858).
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and explain how our non-contentious approach to the exception would help
to clarify and rationalize the law.
A. Ankenbrandt v. Richards
The Supreme Court’s attempt to clarify the scope of and rationale for
the domestic relations exception arose in the context of a tort suit brought by
a mother on behalf of her children against their father for alleged physical
and sexual abuse.189  The parties were diverse (having separated) and the
claim for damages easily met the amount in controversy.190  After both the
district and appellate courts dismissed the case, holding that it fell within the
domestic relations exception, the Court granted review to consider whether a
domestic relations exception existed and, if it did, to define its scope.191
After considering the history and concluding that the domestic relations
exception was best understood as a gloss on the statutory grant of diversity
jurisdiction, the Court held that the exception encompassed only those suits
seeking a decree of divorce, alimony, or child custody.192  Because the case at
hand did not implicate those matters, the Court upheld jurisdiction.193
Although one can quibble with its approach to statutory interpreta-
tion,194 Ankenbrandt achieved some notable goals.  First, by basing the domes-
tic relations exception squarely on the diversity statute, the Court freed
Congress to assign the federal courts a role in any domestic relations issues
that implicate federal law.195  Second, by rejecting arguments that posited a
constitutional foundation for the exception, the Court eliminated the possi-
bility that the limits of Article III would deprive the federal courts of power to
take up matters that Congress had chosen to assign to them.  As we have
seen, treaties address the problem of child custody across international bor-
ders; Congress may implement such a treaty by assigning custody issues to the
federal courts.196  Third, by emphasizing that only the issuance of decrees of
divorce, alimony, and custody lie beyond the diversity jurisdiction of the
lower federal courts, the Court has reaffirmed the lesson of Barber v. Barber:
former spouses with separate domiciles may invoke diversity to settle a dis-
pute over the terms of their former relationship.
189 Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 691 (1992).
190 Id. at 707.
191 Id. at 691–92.
192 Id. at 706.
193 Id.
194 Many commentators have noted the Court’s “shaky foundation” for the domestic
relations exception. See, e.g., Cahn, supra note 1, at 1085 (noting the Court’s “questionable
reasoning” in relying on the diversity statute for the exception); Sack, supra note 9, at 1451,
1453 (calling the Court’s statutory basis for the exception “strained” and resting on a
“shaky foundation”).
195 Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 697–701; see also Cahn, supra note 1, at 1083 (stating that
Ankenbrandt “does not preclude Congress from enacting legislation to change the parame-
ters of the Exception to allow federal courts to hear these [domestic relations] cases”).
196 See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
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Our non-contentious account of the domestic relations exception would
achieve some of the same goals, but would come at the problem from a dif-
ferent angle.  In contrast to the Court, we view the exception as constitution-
ally grounded in the federal courts’ inability to administer the state law of
domestic relations except in the context of a controversy between citizens of
different states.  That interpretation of Article III’s reference to “controver-
sies” means that the federal courts lack the power to exercise non-conten-
tious jurisdiction over many current domestic relations matters, including
marriage, consensual separation and divorce, adoption, and surrogacy pro-
ceedings.  (We explore these non-contentious proceedings in a bit greater
detail below.)  At the same time, we regard the federal courts as enjoying full
authority to conduct such non-contentious proceedings when they implicate
federal law and arrive on the docket as federal question “cases.”  Like Anken-
brandt, then, our approach achieves the goal of co-extensivity197 by assuring
that the federal courts can hear all domestic relations questions that arise
under federal law.
We have no quibble with the Court’s narrow interpretation of the diver-
sity statute, we agree with its holding as to the existence of jurisdiction over
the tort claims of the former spouse, and we certainly do not advocate for an
expansion of that statutory source of federal judicial authority.  Nonetheless,
we would observe that our approach would leave Congress free to expand
diversity if it chose to do so.  In particular, we see nothing in Article III that
would prevent the federal courts from entertaining a contested state-law
divorce proceeding, so long as it arose between citizens of different states.
Nor do we regard the incidental issues that might arise in connection with
such a proceeding, including alimony and child custody, as necessarily lying
beyond federal power.  In general, federal courts that obtain jurisdiction on
the basis of diversity can entertain the whole case, including such incidental
questions.198  It is not obvious that the Ankenbrandt Court would disagree;
having disavowed any constitutional underpinning, the Court recognized
broad power in Congress to manage the scope of diversity jurisdiction.  In
the end, the Court was content (as are we) to allow Congress to decide
whether to expand the role of federal courts, sitting in diversity, over disputes
arising in the family law realm.199
Having thus explained our understanding of Ankenbrandt and having
highlighted our points of agreement and disagreement with the Court’s
approach, we now consider a range of issues that our non-contentious
account can help to clarify.  We focus primarily on debates that have arisen in
the scholarly literature, although we do offer some thoughts on recent devel-
197 See supra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s pronouncements
on the goal of co-extensivity).
198 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012) (defining federal courts’ supplemental
jurisdiction).
199 Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 700 (stating that “Congress remains free to alter what [the
Court] ha[s] done” (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172–73
(1989) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
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opments in the lower courts, where old questions continue to puzzle and
confuse.
B. Domestic Relations in Federal Territories
The non-contentious approach helps to explain the otherwise curious
willingness of the Supreme Court to exercise appellate jurisdiction over
divorce proceedings conducted in the territorial courts.200  Commentators
have highlighted the perceived anomalies of such territorial power by point-
ing to the Court’s decision in Simms v. Simms.201  There, a wife who had won
a favorable alimony decree in the Arizona territorial court moved on the
strength of the domestic relations exception to dismiss her husband’s appeal
to the Supreme Court.  The Court denied the motion, contrasting the
breadth of federal legislative and judicial power in the territories with the
situation in the states, where the “whole subject” of husband and wife and
parent and child belongs to the laws of the states and not to the laws of the
United States.202  Barbara Atwood treats this distinction as inaptly suggesting
that “because state law controls in the domestic relations area, the federal
courts are without power to entertain [such] cases.”203  Atwood argues that
such a view would prove too much in that it would invalidate all jurisdiction
based on diversity of citizenship.204
While Atwood correctly observes that virtually all disputes within federal
diversity jurisdiction involve issues of non-federal law, we do not regard the
Simms account as necessarily anomalous.  In our view, when federal law
defines the rights and liabilities of the parties, the federal courts have power
to exercise the full panoply of contentious and non-contentious jurisdiction.
In theory, then, were Congress to adopt a federal statute regulating marriage
and divorce, alimony and custody, we think the federal courts could exercise
full authority over the issues of status such legislation would bring to the
courts.  That was precisely the situation presented in Simms.205  Territorial
law can be best understood as a species of federal law (although some cutting
200 See, e.g., De La Rama v. De La Rama, 201 U.S. 303, 307–08 (1906) (holding that the
general rule that “the courts of the United States have no jurisdiction upon the subject of
divorce, or for the allowance of alimony, either as an original proceeding in chancery, or
an incident of a divorce or separation” has “no application to the jurisdiction of the territo-
rial courts”); Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162 (1899) (affirming a judgment for alimony in a
suit for divorce arising from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the Territory of Arizona).
201 175 U.S. 162 (1899).
202 Id. at 167–68.
203 Atwood, supra note 1, at 581.
204 Id.
205 The Court found that, in the territories of the United States, Congress “has full
legislative power over all subjects upon which the legislature of a State might legislate
within the State; and may, at its discretion, intrust that power to the legislative assembly of
a Territory.” Simms, 175 U.S. at 168.  This power covers domestic relations and “all other
matters which, within the limits of a State, are regulated by the laws of the State only.” Id.
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and pasting may be required to account for the federal judicial role).206
Simms can thus be read as distinguishing the broad non-contentious power of
federal courts in matters governed by federal law and the far more con-
strained federal judicial power in matters governed by state law.  The exten-
sion of judicial power to “cases” in Article III authorizes federal courts to
exercise non-contentious jurisdiction, including power to adjust issues of sta-
tus governed by federal law.  The judicial power over diverse-party “contro-
versies,” by contrast, entails the resolution of disputes.  It follows, then, that
federal courts in the states, called upon to apply state law in diversity pro-
ceedings, cannot exercise the forms of non-contentious jurisdiction impli-
cated in many matters of domestic relations law. Simms illustrates the
important point that Article III permits the federal courts to administer fed-
eral law but confers no similar power with respect to state law.207
Atwood draws a second conclusion from the territorial cases with which
we disagree.  In the course of criticizing the historical rationale for the
domestic relations exception, a rationale that links the exception to the his-
toric role of the ecclesiastical courts in England,208 Atwood draws a seem-
ingly logical conclusion.  She concludes that, because the Supreme Court
asserted jurisdiction over domestic relations disputes arising in the territo-
ries, the “domestic relations limitation cannot be of constitutional dimen-
sion.”209  But that conclusion assumes that the domestic relations exception
applies with equal force to “cases” and “controversies”; the conclusion rests
on the unspoken premise that the federal judicial power extends in precisely
the same way to all matters within Article III.  We agree with Atwood that the
Supreme Court’s recent tradition of conflating the terms “cases” and “contro-
versies”210 lends support to the premise of her argument.  At least since the
late nineteenth century, the Court has linked the two terms in speaking of
the Article III case-or-controversy requirement.211  But we disagree that the
terms mean the same thing and impose equivalent limits on federal judicial
power.  Instead, we argue that federal courts can exercise broader non-con-
tentious authority in administering claims and matters of status that consti-
206 On the role of federal courts in the territories, see generally James E. Pfander, Arti-
cle I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV.
643 (2004).
207 Thus, federal courts in the District of Columbia have exercised original jurisdiction
in matters of divorce with the Supreme Court’s approval. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370
U.S. 530, 581 n.54 (1962) (upholding the exercise of original jurisdiction by federal courts
in the District of Columbia to decide divorce actions).
208 See supra Section II.A.
209 Atwood, supra note 1, at 587.
210 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2686 (2013) (discussing the “necessity
of a ‘case or controversy’ to satisfy Article III” adverseness (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 939 (1983))).
211 See, e.g., Plaquemines Tropical Fruit Co. v. Henderson, 170 U.S. 511, 517 (1898)
(discussing states’ concurrent jurisdiction to hear issues arising under federal law and stat-
ing that “[n]othing more was done by the Constitution than to extend the judicial power
of the United States to specified cases and controversies”).
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tute “cases” under federal law.  In contrast to Atwood, then, we believe that
the domestic relations exception is “of constitutional dimension” in that it
grows out of the constitutional distinction between cases and controversies.
Federal courts can certainly hear cases like Simms, but they cannot constitu-
tionally entertain matters governed by state law without a controversy
between diverse citizens or a federal question claim that would anchor sup-
plemental jurisdiction.
C. Child Custody, Guardianship, and the Parens Patriae Power
The domestic relations bar to the assertion of federal jurisdiction over
matters of child custody traces its complicated origins to guardianship prac-
tice in England.  Often characterized as part of the Crown’s prerogative or
parens patriae powers,212 these guardianship duties were said to fall to the
chancellor as the ministerial, rather than judicial, delegate of the Crown.213
In the nineteenth century, federal courts in the United States drew on this
characterization of guardianship as a matter of prerogative in disclaiming
federal jurisdiction over custody matters that arose in the context of domestic
relations disputes.214  Scholars in turn have offered varying accounts of those
nineteenth-century pronouncements and of their continuing relevance
today.  Some have ascribed constitutional significance to this barrier to fed-
eral engagement;215 others have shrugged off the whole business.216
For our purposes, the story begins with In re Burrus.217  There, a father
sought custody of his child who had been placed with grandparents while the
child’s mother was ill.218  After the mother died and the father remarried, he
sought to regain custody.219  The father proceeded by a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in the federal district court, demanding that the grandparents
turn over custody of the child.220  The district court awarded custody to the
father, but the grandparents subsequently reclaimed the child by force.  Held
in contempt, the grandfather sought review in the Supreme Court.  The
212 The Latin phrase “parens patriae” refers to the Crown’s authority to act on behalf of
children and the disabled as the “parent of her country.”
213 See CHITTY, supra note 21, at 156 (detailing the prerogatives of the Crown).
214 See, e.g., Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S. 369, 384 (1854) (“Powers not judicial, exercised
by the chancellor merely as the representative of the sovereign, and by virtue of the king’s
prerogative as parens patriae, are not possessed by the circuit courts.”); In re Barry, 42 F.
113, 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1844) (holding that the circuit court “cannot exercise the common-law
function of parens patriae, and has no common-law jurisdiction over the matter [of child
custody]”).
215 Vestal & Foster, supra note 1, at 36 (noting that if the states alone have the power to
act as parens patriae, the problem may be of constitutional origin).
216 See Atwood, supra note 1, at 595–98 (dismissing the Court’s use of parens patriae and
suggesting the better approach is “to focus on whether federal court resolution of particu-
lar categories of cases threatens interference with important state policies”).
217 136 U.S. 586 (1890).
218 Id. at 587.
219 Id.
220 Id.
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Court ultimately held that the district court had no jurisdiction to order the
grandfather to deliver up custody of the child (and hence no authority to
punish his disobedience), reasoning that “[t]he whole subject of the domes-
tic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the
States and not to the laws of the United States.”221  In justifying its conclu-
sion,222 the Court incorporated an entire circuit court decision, In re
Barry,223 into its opinion.  In the Barry decision, also dealing with a child cus-
tody dispute in the context of a habeas petition, Judge Betts disclaimed fed-
eral jurisdiction over matters involving the exercise of parens patriae powers,
finding that there was “no sure foundation for the assumption that the fed-
eral government possesses common-law prerogatives, inherent in the sover-
eign, which can be exercised without authority of positive law.”224
Although commentators agree that both the Burrus and Barry cases arose
in the context of a habeas corpus petition,225 they agree on little else.  Vestal
and Foster treat the Court’s incorporation of the In re Barry decision as an
adoption of the circuit court’s underlying reasoning;226 they therefore con-
clude that the Court’s disclaimer of federal judicial power over child custody
rests on the Constitution’s failure to confer a federal parens patriae power on
which to predicate a federal custody decree.227  A second commentator pro-
poses a somewhat related understanding.  Drilling down into the nature of
the chancellor’s parens patriae power, a student note argues that guardianship
and custody decisions were seen as non-judicial or ministerial acts.228
Observing that the federal courts enjoy power only to decide genuine cases
and controversies, the student note suggests that the federal courts may lack
the power to take on the function of a “third-party sovereign” in deciding
221 Id. at 593–94.
222 While the Burrus Court assumed with little discussion that domestic relations were
solely within the province of the states, scholars have since argued this was not necessarily
so. See generally Hasday, supra note 66, at 1322–23 (discussing a broader understanding of
family law and the federal government’s involvement in such matters).
223 42 F. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1844).
224 Id. at 119.
225 See Atwood, supra note 1, at 595 (stating that Burrus and the relevant custody deci-
sions of the Court “establish only that child custody disputes are not within the scope of the
habeas corpus statute”).
226 See Vestal & Foster, supra note 1, at 33.
227 Id. at 36.
228 Ullman, supra note 1, at 1859–60.  In Fontain v. Ravenel, Chief Justice Taney
explained the exception in the following terms:
The[ ] words [of Article III, § 2] obviously confer judicial power, and nothing
more; and cannot, upon any fair construction, be held to embrace the preroga-
tive powers, which the king, as parens patriae, in England, exercised through the
courts.  And the chancery jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, as
granted by the [C]onstitution, extends only to cases over which the court of chan-
cery had jurisdiction, in its judicial character as a court of equity.  The wide dis-
cretionary power which the chancellor of England exercises over infants, lunatics,
or idiots, or charities, has not been conferred.
58 U.S. 369, 393 (1854).
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custody matters.229  The note combines history with a suggestion that the
“best interests” determinations on which custody decrees now typically turn
call for a quasi-administrative, rather than a strictly judicial, decision.230
With its distinction between federal law cases and state law controversies,
our non-contentious account clears up some of the confusion that surrounds
the custody exception to federal judicial power.  The federal habeas statute
in place at the time of Burrus permitted federal district courts to entertain
only habeas claims that challenged custody on the basis of federal law.231
The Burrus Court’s indication that the powers over child custody were mat-
ters of state prerogative served to establish that the father’s right to custody
lacked the federal law predicate necessary to warrant the exercise of federal
habeas power under applicable jurisdictional statutes.232  In one sense, then,
Burrus simply confirms our view that most issues within the domestic rela-
tions exception arise under state law and qualify for federal jurisdiction, if at
all, on the basis of diversity of citizenship.  Proceedings based on state law
mostly lie outside the federal judicial power, absent diversity and an amount
in controversy.
When one turns from the question of jurisdiction to a consideration of
the nature of the judicial role in custody proceedings, matters grow a bit
more complicated.  Certain matters associated with the parens patriae power
of the English chancellor were regarded as ministerial.  Thus, the chancellor
was expected to administer the affairs of “ideots and lunatics,” even in the
absence of any bill brought in equity to institute contested legal proceedings
regarding their affairs.233  We regard these administrative duties as a classic
example of the exercise of non-contentious investitive jurisdiction; the chan-
cellor was called upon to conduct inquisitorial (rather than adversarial) pro-
ceedings and to make findings that would establish a new protected status for
229 See Ullman, supra note 1, at 1859 (contrasting those instances where a court sits
impartially and decides disputes on the basis of arguments and those, as with child custody,
where a judge assumes the role of an active third party).
230 Id.
231 Although the Judiciary Act of 1789 extended habeas corpus review only to matters
of federal custody, see Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81 (repealed 1948), the
Reconstruction Congress broadened the reach of the great writ to encompass both state
and federal custody in violation of federal law. See Stephanie Dest, Comment, Federal
Habeas Corpus and State Procedural Default: An Abstention-Based Interest Analysis, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 263, 263 (1989) (noting extension of the writ to state petitioners by the Habeas
Corpus Act of 1867).  The federal courts have never been given jurisdiction to conduct
habeas review of detention in violation of state law.
232 See Atwood, supra note 1, at 595; Cahn, supra note 1, at 1085 (noting that drawing
the child custody exception from Burrus is a “dubious enterprise” as it was not a diversity
case).
233 See 1 A. HIGHMORE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF IDIOCY AND LUNACY 11–15 (Exeter,
N.H., G. Lamson 1822) (describing the Crown’s prerogative power to act as “trustee of the
persons and fortunes of ideots and lunatics” but distinguishing the Crown’s power over
infants as “by no means similar”).
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the individuals in question.234  Guardianships for infants may have been
slightly different; Justice Story reported in his treatise on equity that such
proceedings began with the (often fictional) submission of a bill in equity
alleging that the infant owned property claimed by another.235  But whether
the guardianship proceeding began as an original application for non-con-
tentious relief or as a feigned dispute aimed at securing the appointment of a
guardian, the protection of infants was a matter within the non-contentious
jurisdiction of the chancellor.  It would follow that federal courts lack power
to hear such matters, as such, so long as they remain the subject of state law.
This, we think, explains why the federal courts came to regard themselves as
lacking the power to issue original or freestanding custody and guardianship
decrees.
Here, we emphasize the distinction between original petitions for cus-
tody or guardianship and ancillary applications for custody that arise in con-
nection with or accompany disputes that otherwise satisfy the jurisdictional
requirements of the federal courts.  Federal courts clearly have the power to
entertain original applications for non-contentious relief on matters of fed-
eral law; thus, the federal courts may entertain debtors’ uncontested bank-
ruptcy petitions, even though they seek less to resolve a dispute than to
secure the legal rights (discharge of debts and a fresh start) to which federal
bankruptcy law entitles the debtor.236  Because family law (unlike bank-
ruptcy) remains largely a matter of state law, federal courts lack such original
authority as to guardianship and custody issues.  Nonetheless, we see no con-
stitutional barrier to ancillary jurisdiction over custody questions.
To illustrate the point, consider that when federal courts obtain diversity
jurisdiction over a dispute between creditors and a debtor, they have the
power to administer an equitable receivership and to appoint a supervising
234 The exercise of parens patriae power delegated to the lord chancellor by the king
“confer[red] no jurisdiction, but merely a power of administration.” CHITTY, supra note 21,
at 158.
235 Joseph Story explained:
It often occurs that a Bill is filed for the sole purpose of making an infant a
ward of Chancery; but in such a case, the Bill always states, however untruly, that
the infant has property within the jurisdiction, and the Bill is brought against the
person in whose supposed custody or power the property is.
2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND
AMERICA § 1351 n.1, at 813 (Bos., Little, Brown & Co. 6th ed. 1853) (1836) (“Why such a
mere fiction should be resorted to, has never, as it seems to me, been satisfactorily
explained; and why the Lord Chancellor, exercising the prerogative of the Crown as parens
patriae, might not in his discretion appoint a guardian to an infant, having no other guard-
ian, without any Bill being filed, seems difficult to understand upon principle.”).  Notably,
the chancellor’s power to appoint conservators of the estates of “idiots and lunatics”
derived from the Crown’s prerogative and authorized appointment without any need to
invoke a fictional dispute.  Story’s account thus differs from Justice Taney’s in declining to
lump infants together with idiots and lunatics as part of the chancellor’s non-judicial parens
patriae power. See Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S. 369, 393 (1854).
236 See 28 U.S.C. § 157 (2012) (bankruptcy law); see also Pfander & Birk, supra note 11,
at 1444 (discussing the foundation of positive law in bankruptcy proceedings).
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receiver.237  The administrative process comes into play in connection with
the court’s resolution of the dispute that conferred diversity jurisdiction on
the federal court.  Applying these lessons to the domestic relations context, it
would seem to follow that the federal courts can make custody determina-
tions either where the law of custody has been federalized or where the issue
arises alongside a state-law dispute that would otherwise qualify for federal
jurisdiction.  Thus, if Congress were to broaden the diversity statute to
encompass contested divorces, as we think Article III allows, such disputes
might carry into federal court ancillary issues of custody and support.  As
Atwood notes, in arguing against the recognition of a broad custody excep-
tion to federal judicial power, “the federal courts do not possess a general
parens patriae power as representative of the sovereign” but may properly hear
those matters “falling within their assigned jurisdiction.”238
D. The Adjudication of Marital Status
The non-contentious approach may also help to clarify the nature of
federal judicial power over questions of marital status, a frequent site of con-
testation for courts and commentators.  As commentators have noted, the
Court’s apparent reluctance to decide issues of marital status239 arose well
before its comparatively recent decision in Ankenbrandt disclaiming diversity
jurisdiction over the issuance of divorce and alimony decrees.240  But some
federal courts have tested the boundaries of these limits, taking up disputes
that implicate the parties’ marital status and alimony payments.241  Thus, fed-
eral courts have been willing to exercise jurisdiction over disputes that impli-
cate an executed divorce but have refused jurisdiction over parties seeking a
divorce.242  Commentators have debated the nature of federal power over
237 Thus, the Supreme Court has appointed special masters to develop the factual
record in matters within its original jurisdiction. See Anne-Marie C. Carstens, Lurking in the
Shadows of Judicial Process: Special Masters in the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction Cases, 86
MINN. L. REV. 625, 627 (2002) (noting that appointment of special masters is “not uncom-
mon for the Court in exercising its original jurisdiction”).  Further, the Supreme Court has
long upheld the power of the lower federal courts to appoint equitable receivers, masters,
and other officers to perform similar roles in connection with the adjudication of claims
within their jurisdiction. See, e.g., Hook v. Arizona, 120 F.3d 921, 926 (9th Cir. 1997) (hold-
ing that the district court’s appointment of special master was not abuse of discretion); In
re U.S. Dep’t of Def., 848 F.2d 232, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (same).
238 Atwood, supra note 1, at 596.
239 See, e.g., Vestal & Foster, supra note 1, at 28 (analyzing the leading domestic rela-
tions cases and concluding that it “seems to be that the federal courts will not exercise
jurisdiction where a determination of status is involved”).
240 See generally Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992); see also WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 27, § 3609.1.
241 See, e.g., Friedlander v. Friedlander, 149 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 1998) (reversing the
district court’s dismissal of a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress related to
unpaid alimony as such a case did not implicate the domestic relations exception).
242 See Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 799 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (discussing Supreme
Court precedent involving requests for divorce as inapplicable to the case before it, which
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these status questions.243  Vestal and Foster have proposed a “status-property
distinction” to explain the courts’ decisions to hear property disputes that
turn on marital status and to refuse others that seemingly implicate status
alone.  In general, Vestal and Foster recommend that federal courts should
decline jurisdiction in domestic relations suits when issues of status arise.244
Naomi Cahn disagrees, arguing that the status-property distinction has
proven difficult to apply and lacks any conceptual support that would justify
federal courts in declining to adjudicate status issues.245
By highlighting the investitive (and divestitive)246 nature of certain legal
proceedings, our non-contentious account can help to clarify the scope and
limits of federal power over issues of status.  Federal courts cannot perform
the non-contentious act of officially proclaiming the marriage of two con-
senting adults; by conferring a new status under state law, such proclamations
represent a classic example of the kind of investitive decree247 on a matter of
state law that lies beyond the federal cognizance of “controversies.”  Similarly,
when parties agree to a divorce or separation governed by state law, any
decree a court might make in connection with the resulting change in status
would lie beyond federal judicial power.248  Contested divorces present a dif-
ferent sort of issue; at least in theory, such contests could qualify for the exer-
cise of federal diversity jurisdiction as a controversy between citizens of
different states (although as we have seen, few such disputes would meet the
diversity test and the diversity statute has been definitively construed in
involved a determination of the invalidity of a divorce).  A similar distinction, regarding
the issuance of alimony, was recognized in the Court’s first domestic relations case.  Barber
v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582 (1858).  There, the Court disclaimed jurisdiction for the issuance of
alimony but was careful to note that the parties before it were not seeking a decree but
asking that the already executed decree not be defeated by fraud. Id. at 584 (“Our first
remark is—and we wish it to be remembered—that this is not a suit asking the court for
the allowance of alimony.  That has been done by a court of competent jurisdiction.”).
The Barber Court went on to indicate that it would be willing to pass on the legality of an
already decreed divorce.  Id. at 588 (“It is not necessary for us to pass any opinion upon the
legality of the decree, or upon its operation there or elsewhere to dissolve the vinculum of
the marriage between the defendant and Mrs. Barber.”); see also Atwood, supra note 1, at
594 (noting the Court’s apparent willingness to pass on the executed divorce decree).
243 See, e.g., Vestal & Foster, supra note 1, at 31.
244 Id.
245 See Cahn, supra note 1, at 1093–94.
246 See supra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing the investitive, or divestitive,
nature of divorce proceedings).
247 An “investitive” decree is best understood as a judgment that “effect[s] a change of
status and [is] primarily a source of new jural relations . . . .”  Borchard, supra note 99, at
4–5 (footnote omitted).  Such investitive judgments stand in contrast to “executory” judg-
ments that require a defendant to do something. Id. at 4. The decree of a marriage
merely declares the existence of a jural relation and “cannot be executed, as they order
nothing to be done.” Id. at 5.
248 A divorce may be similarly characterized as “investitive” as it works a change in sta-
tus.  Some have used the term divestitive for divorce decrees, however, as the change in
status is to divest one of the marital status. See id. at 32.
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Ankenbrandt to rule out such contests).  We think the construct of the investi-
tive non-contentious decree has much to offer in sorting out the proper
scope of federal judicial power.
Consider, for illustrative purposes, Judge Weinstein’s incisive decision in
Spindel v. Spindel.249  There, the plaintiff brought suit alleging that her for-
mer husband fraudulently induced her to marry him and then fraudulently
procured a Mexican divorce.  Having established a separate home, she
brought suit in diversity to nullify the divorce and obtain a substantial prop-
erty settlement.  As Judge Weinstein emphasized, the plaintiff did not apply
to federal court either for a marriage or for a divorce; rather, the plaintiff
asked that a fraudulent divorce be invalidated.250  While the action, if suc-
cessful, would change the plaintiff’s legal status from divorced under Mexi-
can law to that of married under New York law, the suit was not brought to
secure an investitive (or divestitive) decree.  Rather, the point of the litiga-
tion was to test the validity of a legally significant act that had been per-
formed under the laws of Mexico.  The parties, in short, sought to litigate
their jural relationship, which was contested, rather than to alter those rela-
tions through an investitive act.  Judge Weinstein accordingly agreed to hear
the case, noting that while Barber and related cases barred the federal courts
from issuing a divorce decree,251 it left them free to hear a dispute over the
validity of a decree issued by another tribunal.  For Weinstein, then, despite
“occasional extravagant disclaimers” to the contrary, “it has long been recog-
nized that the federal courts are competent to determine matters involving
some aspects of marital status, either directly or indirectly.”252
We think Weinstein correctly identified the distinction between an inves-
titive decree that seeks to alter jural relations (marriage, divorce)253 and a
dispute over the current status of the parties’ jural relations that may result in
a decree that alters that status.  What’s more, Weinstein showed that the
English Court of Chancery observed this distinction in the course of deter-
mining what sorts of status-clarifying claims it could hear as inter partes dis-
putes and what sorts of status-altering matters were properly left to the
ecclesiastical courts.  Although the ecclesiastical courts were the proper
forum in which to pursue divorce decrees, temporal courts often stepped in
to enforce such decrees or otherwise to decide questions of marital status
incidental to their jurisdiction.  Because temporal courts had exclusive juris-
249 283 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
250 Id. at 799 (stating that certain domestic relations precedents “are not applicable to
the instant case which involves, not a request for a divorce, but a determination of the
invalidity of a divorce”).
251 See Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582, 584 (1858) (distinguishing between the request
for the issuance of a divorce or alimony decree and a judgment preventing such a decree
from being defeated by fraud).
252 Spindel, 283 F. Supp. at 810.
253 See Borchard, supra note 99, at 4–5 (discussing the investitive nature of divorce
decrees).
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diction over matters of property,254 they were often called upon to address
issues of marital status in the course of their usual run of litigation.  Chancery
courts also agreed to enforce separation agreements and to decree mainte-
nance for separated spouses.255  It was thus not unusual for a temporal court
to decide the legality of claims involving marital status when they arose as
incidents to the rightful exercise of their jurisdiction.256
The distinction between investitive decrees and disputes that arise over
existing relations or status should help the lower courts to maintain a prop-
erly narrow view of the scope of the domestic relations exception after Anken-
brandt.  In Kahn v. Kahn,257 the Eighth Circuit failed to honor this distinction
in the course of concluding that the domestic relations exception applied to
a tort action alleging breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and fraud.  There,
after the plaintiff had obtained a divorce and a state court had divided mari-
tal property, she sued her ex-husband in federal court for wrongful conduct
that had taken place during the couple’s marriage.258  Finding that these
issues had already been adjudicated as part of the state court’s divorce pro-
ceeding, the district court dismissed the action as barred by the doctrine of
claim preclusion.259  The Eighth Circuit declined to reach preclusion on
appeal, ruling instead that the district court lacked jurisdiction over issues “so
inextricably intertwined with the prior property settlement incident to the
divorce proceeding” that the domestic relations exception was implicated.260
The conclusion seems clearly inconsistent with Ankenbrandt and with the rec-
ognition that federal courts may hear disputes that call marital status into
question or seek to contest the legality of events that occurred during
marriage.
E. Adoption and Surrogacy in the Lower Federal Courts
Our non-contentious account of the domestic relations exception can
also help to clarify some of the issues that may confuse the lower federal
courts in the wake of Ankenbrandt.  With the rise of surrogacy agreements,
254 LEONARD SHELFORD, A PRACTICAL TREATISE OF THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
260 (Philadelphia, John S. Littell 1841) (“The temporal courts have the sole cognizance of
examining and deciding directly upon all the temporal rights of property; and so far as
such rights are concerned, they have the inherent power of deciding incidentally, either
upon the fact, or the legality of marriage.”).
255 See R.J. Peaslee, Separation Agreements Under the English Law, 15 HARV. L. REV. 638,
639-40 (1902) (detailing early English cases wherein the Chancery court assumed the
power to decree support to the wife when the husband had not fulfilled his spousal duty or
a separation had already been decreed by an ecclesiastical court).
256 Id. at 640.
257 21 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 1994).
258 Id. at 860–61.
259 Id. at 861.
260 Id. at 861–62 (also noting that the plaintiff’s tort claims would require the district
court to “inquire into matters directly relating to the marital relationship”).
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adoptions, and related paternity and custody litigation,261 lower federal
courts must sometimes consider whether these tangled issues belong on their
dockets.262  Although Ankenbrandt does not address these matters directly,
our non-contentious account may point the way.  Consider a case like Berwick
v. Wagner,263 which grew out of the parties’ agreed-upon use of new repro-
duction technology.  There, two same-sex members of a California domestic
partnership, while living in Texas, arranged a surrogacy contract calling for
an unrelated third party to deliver a child through in vitro implantation.264
Detailed contracts set forth the duties involved, and called for the issuance of
a California birth certificate naming the two same-sex partners as parents of
the child.  Following birth of the child, a California decree was duly entered
at the parties’ request, upholding paternity as reflected in the birth certifi-
cate.265  Later, in Texas, a dispute arose over custody following the dissolu-
tion of their same-sex marriage.
In assessing what role a federal court could play in the resulting litiga-
tion, the combined lessons of Ankenbrandt and non-contentious jurisdiction
lend some clarity. Ankenbrandt forecloses a direct federal judicial role in cus-
tody battles.266  But it says nothing about the enforcement of surrogacy con-
tracts or about the litigation that may arise from them.  Here, the fact that
surrogacy agreements arise through the consent of the parties would tend to
reveal a non-contentious foundation to the surrogacy relationship.  Similarly,
the agreed-upon paternity judgment and decree as to the content of the
birth certificate would likely evade federal judicial power on the ground that
there is no dispute or controversy within the meaning of the federal diversity
statute.  Only after the legal steps have been taken, creating a new set of legal
relationships (parent, child, birth parent) can the federal courts get involved
and then only to resolve disputes between diverse citizens as to the legality of
the new relationships.
For much the same reason, federal courts cannot preside over an adop-
tion and decree its effectiveness, but they could conceivably hear a dispute
over the legal effect of an adoption.267  Such an issue arose in Johnson v.
261 For a discussion of the rise in surrogacy agreements and the related legal complica-
tions, see Carol Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-Making: In the Matter of Baby M, 30
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 67 (2007) (discussing the rise of surrogacy and the current state of
the law in the context of In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988)).
262 See, e.g., Newman v. Indiana, 129 F.3d 937, 939 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Ankenbrandt
for the proposition that “domestic relations, including adoptions, is the primary responsi-
bility of the state courts, administering state law, rather than of the federal courts”).
263 No. 01–12–00872–CV, 2014 WL 4493470 (Tex. App. Sept. 11, 2014).
264 Id. at *1.
265 Id.
266 Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992) (holding that “the domestic rela-
tions exception, as articulated by this Court since Barber, divests the federal courts of power
to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees”).
267 In Illinois, the process of changing one’s name has been structured as a non-conten-
tious mode. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/21-101 (West 2007) (“Proceedings; parties.  If
any person who is a resident of this State and has resided in this State for 6 months desires
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Rodrigues (Orozco).268  There, the biological father of an adopted child sought
relief in federal district court asking that custody of the child be assigned to
him and arguing that Utah’s adoption statute was unconstitutional.269  On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit found that the domestic relations exception barred
the court from vitiating the adoption and assigning custody to the father.  It
nonetheless allowed the constitutional challenge,270 ruling that it “[did] not
require the district court to make a child custody determination.”271  The
decision blends two features of the domestic relations exception: federal
courts should not exercise jurisdiction over an adoption agreement entered
into on a non-contentious basis.272  But after an adoption decree has been
rendered, thus working a change in the child’s status, a federal court might
be called upon to resolve disputes that implicate either their federal question
or diversity jurisdiction.  So long as the federal court can grant relief without
issuing a custody order that would run afoul of Ankenbrandt, the domestic
relations exception should pose no bar.
CONCLUSION
In offering a novel non-contentious view of the domestic relations excep-
tion, this Article builds on a suggested distinction between the Article III
references to “cases” and “controversies.”  While scholars and jurists, operat-
ing in the shadow of the Supreme Court’s standing decisions, understandably
proceed on the assumption that the judicial power means precisely the same
thing in both settings, we believe that the nature of the judicial power differs
in “cases” and “controversies.”  When the federal courts entertain “cases” aris-
ing under federal law, they enjoy full power to administer the law by hearing
to change his or her name and to assume another name by which to be afterwards called
and known, the person may file a petition in the circuit court of the county wherein he or
she resides praying for that relief.  If it appears to the court that the conditions hereinafter
mentioned have been complied with and that there is no reason why the prayer should not
be granted, the court, by an order to be entered of record, may direct and provide that the
name of that person be changed in accordance with the prayer in the petition.”).
268 226 F.3d 1103 (10th Cir. 2000).
269 Id. at 1105–07.  The case was characterized as arising under both 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(2012) (federal question) and 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (federal diversity) jurisdiction. Johnson,
226 F.3d at 1105.
270 Johnson, 226 F.3d at 1111–12 (holding that the “domestic relations exception plainly
bar[red] the district court from granting [the issuance of an injunction as to the adoption
order] in exercising diversity jurisdiction” but that the plaintiff’s constitutional challenge
“d[id] not fall within the domestic relations exception”).
271 Id. at 1111. Johnson illustrates an important point: that even though issues of state
law might come to federal court as part of one constitutional “case” based on the presence
of a federal claim that supplies the basis for an exercise of supplemental jurisdiction, the
domestic relations exception should govern such issues.
272 Adoption has historically fallen within the sphere of state regulation and thus, in
the absence of a controversy, a federal court may not hear a claim over an adoption agree-
ment.  For a history of adoption in the United States, see Naomi Cahn, Perfect Substitutes or
the Real Thing?, 52 DUKE L.J. 1077 (2003).
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both contentious and non-contentious matters.  When, by contrast, they sit to
resolve “controversies” over state law, they perform only a dispute-resolution
role.  To the extent that the law of domestic relations implicates supreme
federal law, federal courts may naturally exercise broader authority.  But so
long as state law furnishes the rule of decision, federal courts must play a
more circumspect role.  In particular, as we have argued, the federal courts
should refrain from entertaining original applications for the entry of non-
contentious investitive decrees, such as marriages, consensual separations
and divorces, adoptions, and other matters in which the parties voluntarily
agree to a change in their legal status.
While our proposed account focuses in the main on constitutional
meaning and does not contest the holding in Ankenbrandt, the Court’s latest
word on the interpretation of the diversity statute, we nonetheless believe
that a non-contentious understanding contributes something important to
the law.  For starters, we think the non-contentious account helps to explain,
as a historical matter, how the domestic relations exception arose in the deci-
sional law of the nineteenth century.  Many of the Court’s most confusing
pronouncements were simple declarations about the state-law origins of
much domestic relations law.273  While controversies over state law flow
freely onto federal diversity dockets, the absence of a controversy between
diverse citizens would foreclose a federal judicial role.  Our approach also
explains the Court’s willingness to authorize federal judicial engagement
with domestic relations issues when they implicate federal law.  Federal
courts have a broader role to play in administering federal law than they do
when the subject at hand rests on the laws of the states; issues of divorce and
alimony, if creatures of federal law, do not lie beyond federal judicial power
as the Court confirmed in Simms v. Simms.274  Far from anomalous, the will-
ingness of the federal courts to administer federal domestic relations law in
the territories confirms the explanatory power of our proposed case-contro-
versy distinction.
By securing the principle of co-extensivity, our approach clarifies that
federal courts have full power to engage with any subjects of family law that
come to be seen as governed by federal law.  Many observers believe that, as
our society becomes more mobile, questions of family law will demand
greater attention from Congress and from those who negotiate international
treaties.275  Our approach provides a straightforward account of congres-
273 See, e.g., In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 594 (1890) (finding that the whole subject of the
“domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the
States”); Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S. 369, 393 (1854) (discussing states’ power over
“minors, idiots, and lunatics, or charities”); Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. 103, 115 (1847) (stat-
ing that all questions relating to domestic relations “are peculiarly and appropriately within
the province of the State governments”).
274 175 U.S. 162 (1899); see also De La Rama v. De La Rama, 201 U.S. 303 (1906)
(allowing review of a judgment reversing a divorce decree in the territory of the
Philippines).
275 See Cahn, supra note 1, at 1075.
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sional power to assign such matters to federal courts.  What’s more, our
approach (like that of Ankenbrandt) would authorize Congress to broaden
diversity jurisdiction to encompass contested divorces between diverse par-
ties.  (We see little prospect that such a proposal will gain traction with the
political branches or that, if enacted, it would burden federal courts unduly.
Contested divorces rarely occur these days and rarely arise between parties
who maintain separate domiciles.)  Such an authorization could address the
concern of some critics that the domestic relations exception has resulted in
the wholesale, and perhaps biased, relegation of family law matters to state
courts.276  More to the point, while our theory does not propose a drastic
change in the scope of the domestic relations exception, it does offer a tex-
tual and historical framework for conducting a principled assessment of the
scope of federal jurisdiction over domestic relations cases.
276 See supra notes 83–85 and accompanying text.
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